Title: Modeling crime response to deterrence and positive incentives: existence of solutions, optimal policies, and fairness

Date: November 13th , 2026

Time: 11 AM - 1 PM, EST

Location: Guggenheim 246

Zoom link: https://gatech.zoom.us/j/7854428648?pwd=MjkvcHRXY2lqZVJXRS9PS1Y4dEVkZz09

Committee:

Dr. Martin Short (Advisor)

Dr. Sung Ha Kang

Dr. Wenjing Liao

Dr. Haomin Zhou

Dr. George Mohler

Abstract:

In this work we study a model in which rational agents decide whether or not to commit crime based on a utility calculation, influenced by a judge who sets a society-wide threshold corresponding to the likelihood of an individual being found guilty and a legislator who sets a society-wide punishment level. We first study how the overall crime rate is influenced by the judge's threshold and the legislator's punishment level, propose an objective function for the judge and legislator to minimize, and study the optimal threshold and punishment levels for this objective.  We then consider the case in which the overall society is subdivided into multiple groups with varying characteristics, introducing a constraint on fairness in treatment between the groups.  We study how an optimal threshold and punishment level might be chosen under this fairness constraint, what ramifications the constraints have on outcomes for individuals, and under what circumstances the constrained optimum agrees with the unconstrained optimum. Then we introduce a new lever for the justice system in the form of positive incentives for the agents: first as a subsidy and then later as a program motivated by the Trusted Traveler Program where agents can opt in or opt out from taking the positive incentive in exchange for some extra initial investigation. We then study the optimal threshold, punishment level, and positive incentive level that achieves the justice system's objective for both unlimited budget and a budget constraint