Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a decentralized market architecture for 
integrating distributed energy resources into modern electricity distribution systems. In these 
markets, prosumers exchange surplus electricity directly through bilateral transactions rather 
than relying on centralized wholesale market clearing. While decentralized P2P trading offers 
local energy utilization and consumer participation, it also introduces strategic interactions 
among self-interested participants operating within the physical constraints of low-voltage, threephase distribution networks. Existing research has investigated strategic electricity markets, 
network sensitivity analysis, and three-phase distribution system modeling as largely 
independent problems. Comparatively, less attention has been devoted to developing a unified 
decentralized framework in which strategic bilateral market interactions, prosumer duality, and 
three-phase network feasibility are jointly represented while preserving decentralized market 
behavior. This dissertation develops a decentralized game-theoretic framework for P2P energy trading that 
integrates strategic market behavior with distribution network operation. First, a P2P market 
model is formulated to analyze bilateral trading under fixed buyer and seller roles where strategic 
pricing and market equilibrium is determined. Second, the framework is extended through 
prosumer duality, allowing each participant to simultaneously determine energy purchases and 
energy sales where that market roles emerge from equilibrium rather than being assigned a fixed 
assignment. Finally, the decentralized market is coupled with a three-phase AC power flow 
formulation that explicitly incorporates voltage constraints into the coordination of bilateral 
energy exchanges.