Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a decentralized market architecture for integrating distributed energy resources into modern electricity distribution systems. In these markets, prosumers exchange surplus electricity directly through bilateral transactions rather than relying on centralized wholesale market clearing. While decentralized P2P trading offers local energy utilization and consumer participation, it also introduces strategic interactions among self-interested participants operating within the physical constraints of low-voltage, three-phase distribution networks. Existing research has investigated strategic electricity markets, network sensitivity analysis, and three-phase distribution system modeling as largely independent problems. Comparatively, less attention has been devoted to developing a unified decentralized framework in which strategic bilateral market interactions, participants who can be both buyers and sellers, and three-phase network feasibility are jointly represented while preserving decentralized market behavior.

 

This dissertation develops a decentralized game-theoretic framework for P2P energy trading that integrates strategic market behavior with distribution network operation. First, a P2P market model is formulated to analyze bilateral trading under fixed buyer and seller roles where strategic pricing and market equilibrium is determined. Second, the framework is extended to allow each participant to determine both energy purchases and energy sales, where the market roles emerge endogenously rather than being a fixed assignment. Finally, the decentralized market is coupled with a three-phase AC power flow formulation that explicitly incorporates voltage constraints into the coordination of bilateral energy exchanges.