I cordially invite you to attend my dissertation proposal scheduled on Thursday, May 1st, from 10:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. in Scheller College of Business, Room 313. Please find the abstract below, and copies of the paper will be available upon request.  

Donghyun (Daniel) Choi
PhD Student, Operations Management
Scheller College of Business | Georgia Institute of Technology
 

Area: Operations Management

Committee members: Dr. Andre Calmon (co-chair), Dr. Beril Toktay (co-chair), Dr. Manpreet Hora, Dr. Benjamin Jordan (The Coca-Cola Company)

Title: Essays on Corporate Sustainability Targets

Global firms increasingly face pressure to address a wide range of sustainability challenges, including carbon emissions, waste generation, and resource circularity. These pressures arise from both regulatory mandates and voluntary commitments, prompting firms to adjust their capacity investments, operational strategies, and supply chain practices to meet evolving expectations. This dissertation employs econometric analysis and analytical modeling to examine how different types of sustainability metrics influence firm decision-making and offers prescriptive insights for managers and policymakers.

Essay 1: Effect of Slack Resources and Emissions Controllability on Science-Based Target Adoption

The Science-Based Targets initiative (SBTi) has become a leading framework for guiding corporate climate action by providing standardized benchmarks for greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction. This essay examines how slack resources influence a firm’s likelihood of adopting SBTi commitments. Leveraging data from over 13,000 global firms, the analysis distinguishes between absorbed slack (less fungible, embedded in operations) and unabsorbed slack (more fungible). The results show that absorbed slack significantly increases the probability of voluntary target adoption, particularly when firms have internal governance mechanisms like internal carbon pricing or carbon-linked incentives. In contrast, high proportions of Scope 3 emissions—those outside a firm’s direct control—diminish the effectiveness of slack resources, especially unabsorbed slack. These findings suggest that firms must not only possess slack but also implement structures that make these resources actionable in the face of climate transition risk. The results also underscore the importance of improving SBTi guidance on supply chain emissions to reduce firms’ perceived risk around target achievability.

Essay 2: Global Target, Local Decision: Coordinating Decentralized Firms Under Climate Commitments

Global firms are allocating budget between internal carbon mitigation efforts and the purchase of environmental credits outside of the firm. In this essay, I develop an analytical model to study how firms manage internal decarbonization when decision-making is decentralized across subsidiaries. A central headquarters (HQ) bears the firm’s reputational and regulatory exposure to carbon emissions, while subsidiaries often focus on local profit maximization. The essay compares two internal carbon pricing mechanisms: shadow pricing, in which HQ imposes a hypothetical carbon cost on investment decisions, and internal carbon fees, where subsidiaries are charged directly for operational emissions. The model characterizes when and how each mechanism should be used, including how internal prices should relate to external carbon prices (e.g., from emissions trading schemes or taxes). The analysis provides actionable guidance on structuring incentive-compatible internal carbon policies and identifies conditions under which firms should invest in low-carbon technologies or divest from carbon-intensive legacy assets. Overall, the essay contributes to the design of firm-level decarbonization strategies in globally distributed organizations.

Essay 3: From Redundancy to Synergy: Coordinating DRS and EPR in Packaging Waste Management

The third essay shifts focus to the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector, where firms face packaging waste regulations through Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) mandates. In parallel, an increasing number of jurisdictions are implementing Deposit Refund Systems (DRS), particularly for beverage containers. Although DRS and EPR are intended to target different material categories, their coexistence creates strategic interactions and cost interdependencies. This essay develops a game-theoretic model to identify when it is optimal to operate both systems in parallel. A key insight is that high DRS return rates can generate non-monotonic cost implications for Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs) due to sorting requirements and material-specific processing costs.