The European Union is often depicted as a global regulatory power.  In his article "Europe as a Global Regulator? The Limits of EU Influence in International Food Safety Standards," Alasdair Young contends that this depiction, while not unfounded, is misleading.

Young aims to clarify under what conditions the EU converts its regulatory capability into influence.  Specifically it seeks to resolve the puzzle of the EU’s poor performance in the setting of global food safety standards within the Codex Alimentarius Commission.  The argument is deceptively simple.  The EU’s limited influence is due to it being a preference outlier.  In a context where standards can be decided by voting, the stringency of the EU’s regulations, rather than being a source of influence, is a liability. 

This extreme case demonstrates that the EU’s ability to exercise international influence is affected by the constellation of preferences and the distribution of power.  This article, therefore, contributes to the emerging literature that contends that the EU’s international effectiveness can be understood only with explicit reference to the international context within which it is operating.

The article which was published in Volume 21, Issue 6, of the Journal of European Public Policy