ARC Colloquium: Michael O. Rabin, Harvard University, Columbia University

Event Details
  • Date/Time:
    • Monday March 10, 2014
      3:30 pm - 4:30 pm
  • Location: Klaus 1116
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Summary Sentence: Practically Efficient ZKPs for Preventing Collusion in Auctions

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Title: Practically Efficient ZKPs for Preventing Collusion in Auctions


In an important mechanism for sealed bid auctions developed by Vickrey and rewarded by a Nobel Prize, the highest bidder gets the item and pays the second highest bid value. Vickrey proved that for these auctions the best strategy for a participant is to bid his private true value for the item. Despite this advantage, second-price auctions are rarely used because they are subject to collusion of bidders. Employing novel cryptography we show that collusion can be avoided thus solving a long standing open problem. The talk will be generally accessible. Joint work with Silvio Micali.

Additional Information

In Campus Calendar

College of Computing, School of Computer Science, ARC

Invited Audience
Undergraduate students, Faculty/Staff, Graduate students
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  • Created By: Elizabeth Ndongi
  • Workflow Status: Published
  • Created On: Feb 18, 2014 - 8:26am
  • Last Updated: Apr 13, 2017 - 5:23pm