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ARC Colloquium: Yael Kalai, Microsoft
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Abstract:
A *secret key* in cryptography is supposed to be just that -- something that is kept completely secret. However, there is a growing realization that in reality a secret key is not totally secret, as a variety of so-called "side channel" attacks can uncover some information about the secret key, such as some of its bits.
In this talk, I will survey some recent results on cryptographic primitives that are provably secure even with keys which may be partly compromised. I will focus on a recent joint work with Zvika Brakerski, Jonathan Katz, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan, which shows how to construct cryptographic schemes that are secure against ``continual leakage''.
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- Workflow Status:Published
- Created By:Elizabeth Ndongi
- Created:11/16/2011
- Modified By:Fletcher Moore
- Modified:10/07/2016
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