{"689014":{"#nid":"689014","#data":{"type":"news","title":"US Military Leans Into AI for Attack on Iran, But the Tech Doesn\u2019t Lessen the Need for Human Judgment In\u00a0War","body":[{"value":"\u003Cdiv class=\u0022theconversation-article-body\u0022\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe U.S. military was able \u201cto strike a blistering 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours of its attack on Iran\u201d \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/technology\/2026\/03\/04\/anthropic-ai-iran-campaign\/\u0022\u003Ethanks in part to its use of artificial intelligence\u003C\/a\u003E, according to The Washington Post. The military has used Claude, the AI tool from Anthropic, combined with Palantir\u2019s Maven system, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/politics\/national-security\/pentagon-used-anthropics-claude-in-maduro-venezuela-raid-583aff17\u0022\u003Efor real-time targeting and target prioritization\u003C\/a\u003E in support of combat operations in Iran and Venezuela.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhile Claude is only a few years old, the U.S. military\u2019s ability to use it, or any other AI, did not emerge overnight. The effective use of automated systems depends on extensive infrastructure and skilled personnel. It is only thanks to many decades of investment and experience that the U.S. can use AI in war today.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn my experience as an \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?hl=en\u0026amp;user=Lde9BAgAAAAJ\u0026amp;view_op=list_works\u0026amp;sortby=pubdate\u0022\u003Einternational relations scholar\u003C\/a\u003E studying strategic technology at Georgia Tech, and previously as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.cornellpress.cornell.edu\/book\/9781501749568\/information-technology-and-military-power\/\u0022\u003EI find\u003C\/a\u003E that \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.cornellpress.cornell.edu\/book\/9781501783234\/age-of-deception\u0022\u003Edigital systems\u003C\/a\u003E are only as good as the organizations that use them. Some organizations squander the potential of advanced technologies, while others can compensate for technological weaknesses.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EMyth and Reality in Military AI\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EScience fiction tales of military AI are often misleading. Popular ideas of killer robots and drone swarms tend to overstate the autonomy of AI systems and understate the role of human beings. Success, or failure, in war usually depends not on machines but the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/press.princeton.edu\/books\/paperback\/9780691128023\/military-power\u0022\u003Epeople who use them\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn the real world, military AI refers to a huge collection of different systems and tasks. The \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.55163\/YQBY3151\u0022\u003Etwo main categories\u003C\/a\u003E are automated weapons and decision support systems. Automated weapon systems have some ability to select or engage targets by themselves. These weapons are more often the subject of science fiction and the focus of \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.routledge.com\/Responsible-Use-of-AI-in-Military-Systems\/Schraagen\/p\/book\/9781032531168\u0022\u003Econsiderable debate\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDecision support systems, in contrast, are now at the heart of most modern militaries. These are software applications that provide intelligence and planning information to human personnel. Many military applications of AI, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/tech\/ai\/how-ai-is-turbocharging-the-war-in-iran-aca59002\u0022\u003Eincluding in current and recent wars in the Middle East\u003C\/a\u003E, are for decision support systems rather than weapons. Modern combat organizations rely on countless digital applications for intelligence analysis, campaign planning, battle management, communications, logistics, administration and cybersecurity.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EClaude is an example of a decision support system, not a weapon. Claude is embedded in the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/wwnorton.com\/books\/9781324123316\u0022\u003EMaven Smart System\u003C\/a\u003E, used widely by military, intelligence and law enforcement organizations. Maven uses AI algorithms to identify potential targets from satellite and other intelligence data, and Claude helps military planners sort the information and decide on targets and priorities.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Israeli \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2024\/apr\/03\/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes\u0022\u003ELavender and Gospel\u003C\/a\u003E systems used in the Gaza war and elsewhere are also decision support systems. These AI applications provide analytical and planning support, but human beings ultimately make the decisions.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cfigure\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ciframe width=\u0022440\u0022 height=\u0022260\u0022 src=\u0022https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/9NAUvsABm3k?wmode=transparent\u0026amp;start=0\u0022 frameborder=\u00220\u0022 allowfullscreen=\u0022\u0022\u003E\u003C\/iframe\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cfigcaption\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022caption\u0022\u003EResearcher Craig Jones explains how the U.S. military is using artificial intelligence in its attack on Iran, and some of the issues that arise from its use.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/figcaption\u003E\u003C\/figure\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EThe Long History of Military AI\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWeapons with some degree of autonomy have been used in war for \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-hand-behind-unmanned-9780190064389\u0022\u003Ewell over a century\u003C\/a\u003E. Nineteenth-century naval mines exploded on contact. German buzz bombs in World War II were gyroscopically guided. Homing torpedoes and heat-seeking missiles alter their trajectory to intercept maneuvering targets. Many air defense systems, such as Israel\u2019s Iron Dome and the U.S. Patriot system, have long offered fully automatic modes.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.cornellpress.cornell.edu\/book\/9781501783838\/the-remote-revolution\u0022\u003ERobotic drones\u003C\/a\u003E became prevalent in the wars of the 21st century. Uncrewed systems now perform a variety of \u201c\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1109\/HRI61500.2025.10974142\u0022\u003Edull, dirty and dangerous\u003C\/a\u003E\u201d tasks on land, at sea, in the air and in orbit. Remotely piloted vehicles like the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper or Israeli Hermes 900, which can loiter autonomously for many hours, provide a platform for reconnaissance and strikes. Combatants in the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/ig.ft.com\/ukraine-kill-zone\/\u0022\u003ERussia-Ukraine war\u003C\/a\u003E have pioneered the use of first-person view drones as kamikaze munitions. Some drones rely on AI to acquire targets because electronic jamming precludes remote control by human operators.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBut systems that automate reconnaissance and strikes are merely the most visible parts of the automation revolution. The ability to see farther and hit faster dramatically increases the information processing burden on military organizations. This is where decision support systems come in. If automated weapons improve the eyes and arms of a military, decision support systems augment the brain.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECold War era \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/apps.dtic.mil\/sti\/tr\/pdf\/ADA421917.pdf\u0022\u003Ecommand and control\u003C\/a\u003E systems anticipated modern decision support systems such as \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.ynetnews.com\/magazine\/article\/bkhsmzjyzg\u0022\u003EIsrael\u2019s AI-enabled Tzayad\u003C\/a\u003E for battle management. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/mitpress.mit.edu\/9780262550284\/the-closed-world\/\u0022\u003EAutomation research projects\u003C\/a\u003E like the United States\u2019 Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, or SAGE, in the 1950s produced important innovations in computer memory and interfaces. In the U.S. war in Vietnam, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1353\/jmh.0.0024\u0022\u003EIgloo White\u003C\/a\u003E gathered intelligence data into a centralized computer for coordinating U.S. airstrikes on North Vietnamese supply lines. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency\u2019s \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/mitpress.mit.edu\/9780262529266\/strategic-computing\/\u0022\u003Estrategic computing\u003C\/a\u003E program in the 1980s spurred advances in semiconductors and expert systems. Indeed, defense funding originally enabled the rise of AI.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EOrganizations Enable Automated Warfare\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAutomated weapons and decision support systems rely on complementary organizational innovation. From the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/openlibrary.org\/books\/OL5205631M\/The_electronic_battlefield\u0022\u003EElectronic Battlefield\u003C\/a\u003E of Vietnam to the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/apps.dtic.mil\/sti\/tr\/pdf\/ADA202888.pdf\u0022\u003EAirLand Battle\u003C\/a\u003E doctrine of the late Cold War and later concepts of \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.usni.org\/magazines\/proceedings\/1998\/january\/network-centric-warfare-its-origin-and-future\u0022\u003Enetwork-centric warfare\u003C\/a\u003E, the U.S. military has \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.sup.org\/books\/politics\/culture-military-innovation\u0022\u003Edeveloped new ideas and organizational concepts\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EParticularly noteworthy is the emergence of a \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/us.macmillan.com\/books\/9781466876224\/relentlessstrike\/\u0022\u003Enew style of special operations\u003C\/a\u003E during the U.S. global war on terrorism. AI-enabled decision support systems became invaluable for finding terrorist operatives, planning raids to kill or capture them, and analyzing intelligence collected in the process. Systems like Maven became essential for this style of counterterrorism.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe impressive \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/9fae8d27-19ee-437a-8be7-9bceae973001\u0022\u003EAmerican way of war\u003C\/a\u003E on display in Venezuela and Iran is the fruition of decades of trial and error. The U.S. military has honed complex processes for gathering intelligence from many sources, analyzing target systems, evaluating options for attacking them, coordinating joint operations and assessing bomb damage. The only reason AI can be used throughout the targeting cycle is that countless human personnel everywhere work to keep it running.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAI gives rise to important concerns about \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/cset.georgetown.edu\/publication\/ai-safety-and-automation-bias\/\u0022\u003Eautomation bias\u003C\/a\u003E, or the tendency for people to give excessive weight to automated decisions, in military targeting. But these are not new concerns. Igloo White was \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/mitpress.mit.edu\/9780262550284\/the-closed-world\/\u0022\u003Eoften misled\u003C\/a\u003E by Vietnamese decoys. A state-of-the-art U.S. Aegis cruiser \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/press.princeton.edu\/books\/paperback\/9780691002477\/trapped-in-the-net\u0022\u003Eaccidentally shot down\u003C\/a\u003E an Iranian airliner in 1988. Intelligence mistakes led U.S. stealth bombers to accidentally strike the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.cornellpress.cornell.edu\/book\/9781501749568\/information-technology-and-military-power\/\u0022\u003EChinese embassy\u003C\/a\u003E in Belgrade, Serbia, in 1999.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMany Iraqi and Afghan civilians died due to \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0162243917703463\u0022\u003Eanalytical mistakes\u003C\/a\u003E and \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0162243917727353\u0022\u003Ecultural biases\u003C\/a\u003E within the U.S. military. Most recently, evidence suggests that a Tomahawk cruise missile \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/05\/world\/middleeast\/iran-school-us-strikes-naval-base.html\u0022\u003Estruck a girls school\u003C\/a\u003E adjacent to an Iranian naval base, killing about 175 people, mostly students. This targeting could have resulted from a U.S. intelligence failure.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EAutomated Prediction Needs Human Judgment\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe successes and failures of decision support systems in war are due more to organizational factors than technology. AI can help organizations improve their efficiency, but AI can also amplify organizational biases. While it may be tempting to blame Lavender for excessive civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/12\/26\/world\/middleeast\/israel-hamas-gaza-bombing.html\u0022\u003Elax Israeli rules of engagement\u003C\/a\u003E likely matter more than automation bias.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAs the name implies, decision support systems support human decision-making; AI does not replace people. Human personnel still play important roles in designing, managing, interpreting, validating, evaluating, repairing and protecting their systems and data flows. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/press.princeton.edu\/books\/hardcover\/9780691265148\/ai-automation-and-war\u0022\u003ECommanders still command\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn economic terms, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/direct.mit.edu\/books\/book\/4564\/The-Promise-of-Artificial-IntelligenceReckoning\u0022\u003EAI improves prediction\u003C\/a\u003E, which means generating new data based on existing data. But prediction is only one part of decision-making. People ultimately make the judgments that matter about what to predict and how to use predictions. People have preferences, values and commitments regarding real-world outcomes, but AI systems \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/direct.mit.edu\/books\/book\/4564\/The-Promise-of-Artificial-IntelligenceReckoning\u0022\u003Eintrinsically do not\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn my view, this means that increasing military use of AI is actually making \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1162\/isec_a_00425\u0022\u003Ehumans more important in war\u003C\/a\u003E, not less.\u003C!-- Below is The Conversation\u0027s page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --\u003E\u003Cimg style=\u0022border-color:!important;border-style:none;box-shadow:none !important;margin:0 !important;max-height:1px !important;max-width:1px !important;min-height:1px !important;min-width:1px !important;opacity:0 !important;outline:none !important;padding:0 !important;\u0022 src=\u0022https:\/\/counter.theconversation.com\/content\/277831\/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic\u0022 alt=\u0022The Conversation\u0022 width=\u00221\u0022 height=\u00221\u0022 referrerpolicy=\u0022no-referrer-when-downgrade\u0022\u003E\u003C!-- End of code. If you don\u0027t see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https:\/\/theconversation.com\/republishing-guidelines --\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThis article is republished from \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThe Conversation\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cem\u003E under a Creative Commons license. Read the \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/us-military-leans-into-ai-for-attack-on-iran-but-the-tech-doesnt-lessen-the-need-for-human-judgment-in-war-277831\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003Eoriginal article\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cem\u003E.\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E","summary":"","format":"full_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003EDigital systems are only as good as the organizations that use them. Some organizations squander the potential of advanced technologies, while others can compensate for technological weaknesses.\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"Digital systems are only as good as the organizations that use them. Some organizations squander the potential of advanced technologies, while others can compensate for technological weaknesses."}],"uid":"27469","created_gmt":"2026-03-11 15:21:47","changed_gmt":"2026-04-06 17:35:32","author":"Kristen Bailey","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","location":"Atlanta, GA","dateline":{"date":"2026-03-11T00:00:00-04:00","iso_date":"2026-03-11T00:00:00-04:00","tz":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"hg_media":{"679670":{"id":"679670","type":"image","title":" black and white aerial view of an airfield AI is helping U.S. forces find and choose targets in Iran, like this airfield. U.S. Central Command via AP","body":"\u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cimg alt=\u0022black and white aerial view of an airfield\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAI is helping U.S. forces find and choose targets in Iran, like this airfield. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/newsroom.ap.org\/detail\/IranUSIsrael\/e22cbe9b12c7435b9d6b2e9dac131fd5\/photo?vs=false\u0026amp;currentItemNo=32\u0026amp;startingItemNo=150\u0022\u003EU.S. Central Command via AP\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E","created":"1773852352","gmt_created":"2026-03-18 16:45:52","changed":"1773852352","gmt_changed":"2026-03-18 16:45:52","alt":" black and white aerial view of an airfield AI is helping U.S. forces find and choose targets in Iran, like this airfield. U.S. Central Command via AP","file":{"fid":"263859","name":"file-20260310-69-smke4w.jpg","image_path":"\/sites\/default\/files\/2026\/03\/18\/file-20260310-69-smke4w.jpg","image_full_path":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/\/sites\/default\/files\/2026\/03\/18\/file-20260310-69-smke4w.jpg","mime":"image\/jpeg","size":349331,"path_740":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/740xx_scale\/public\/2026\/03\/18\/file-20260310-69-smke4w.jpg?itok=KxNWX1rr"}}},"media_ids":["679670"],"related_links":[{"url":"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/us-military-leans-into-ai-for-attack-on-iran-but-the-tech-doesnt-lessen-the-need-for-human-judgment-in-war-277831","title":"Read This Article on The Conversation"}],"groups":[{"id":"1188","name":"Research Horizons"}],"categories":[],"keywords":[{"id":"187915","name":"go-researchnews"},{"id":"194974","name":"go-theconversation"}],"core_research_areas":[],"news_room_topics":[{"id":"71881","name":"Science and Technology"}],"event_categories":[],"invited_audience":[],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[{"value":"\u003Ch5\u003EAuthor:\u003C\/h5\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/jon-r-lindsay-2615502\u0022\u003EJon R. Lindsay\u003C\/a\u003E, associate professor of Cybersecurity and Privacy and of International Affairs, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/georgia-institute-of-technology-1310\u0022\u003EGeorgia Institute of Technology\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch5\u003EMedia Contact:\u003C\/h5\u003E\u003Cp\u003EShelley Wunder-Smith\u003Cbr\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022mailto:shelley.wunder-smith@research.gatech.edu\u0022\u003Eshelley.wunder-smith@research.gatech.edu\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"email":[],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}