{"687882":{"#nid":"687882","#data":{"type":"news","title":" Iran\u2019s Latest Internet Blackout Extends to Phones and Starlink","body":[{"value":"\u003Cdiv class=\u0022theconversation-article-body\u0022\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Iranian regime\u2019s \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/iran-protests-economy-starlink-internet-disconnect-8d944601e7bfeae6753ec0645f5a7139\u0022\u003Einternet shutdown\u003C\/a\u003E, initiated on Jan. 8, 2026, has severely diminished the flow of information out of the country. Without internet access, little news about the national protests that flared \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/middle-east\/irans-heavy-crackdown-quells-protests-8e757172\u0022\u003Ebetween Dec. 30, 2025, and Jan. 13, 2026\u003C\/a\u003E, and the regime\u2019s violent crackdown has reached the world. Many digital rights and internet monitoring groups have assessed the current shutdown to be the most sophisticated and \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/5d848323-84a9-4512-abd2-dd09e0a786a3\u0022\u003Emost severe in Iran\u2019s history\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWe are a \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?hl=en\u0026amp;user=WBRatTAAAAAJ\u0026amp;view_op=list_works\u0026amp;sortby=pubdate\u0022\u003Esocial scientist\u003C\/a\u003E and two \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?hl=en\u0026amp;user=NLeeizQAAAAJ\u0026amp;view_op=list_works\u0026amp;sortby=pubdate\u0022\u003Ecomputer scientists\u003C\/a\u003E at the Georgia Institute of Technology\u2019s \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/inetintel.cc.gatech.edu\u0022\u003EInternet Intelligence Lab\u003C\/a\u003E who \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?hl=en\u0026amp;user=oZNdAREAAAAJ\u0026amp;view_op=list_works\u0026amp;sortby=pubdate\u0022\u003Estudy internet connectivity\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThrough the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu\/dashboard\u0022\u003EInternet Outage Detection and Analysis\u003C\/a\u003E project, we have been measuring internet connectivity globally since 2011. The project was motivated by the internet shutdowns during the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/event\/Arab-Spring\u0022\u003EArab Spring\u003C\/a\u003E mass protests that began in December 2010 against Middle Eastern and North African regimes.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe project provides a public dashboard of internet connectivity measurements. Its long view of global internet connectivity offers insight into the Iranian regime\u2019s developing sophistication in controlling information and shutting down the internet in the country.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOur measurements show that Iran has been in a complete internet shutdown since Jan. 8. This is longer than the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/ioda.live\/post\/3mcigxurkms2w\u0022\u003E48\u00bd-hour\u003C\/a\u003E shutdown in June 2025 during the Israel-Iran war and surpasses the duration of the November 2019 shutdown that lasted almost seven days. Compared to the two weeks of nightly mobile phone network shutdowns in September to October of 2022 during the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/stories\/2025\/04\/justice-and-accountability-woman-life-freedom-protests\u0022\u003EWomen, Life, Freedom protests\u003C\/a\u003E, this shutdown is more complete by also closing down fixed-line connectivity.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EMeasuring Internet Connectivity\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Internet Outage Detection and Analysis project measures global internet connectivity through three signals related to internet infrastructure: routing announcements, active probing and internet background noise.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECore routers, unlike the router in your home, are responsible for directing traffic to and from networks. Routing announcements are how they communicate with each other. If a nation\u2019s network of routers stop making these announcements, the network will disappear from the global internet.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWe also measure the responsiveness of networks through probing. To create the probing signal, we continuously ping devices in millions of networks around the globe. Most devices are designed to automatically respond to these pings by echoing them back to the sender. We collect these responses and label networks as \u201cconnected\/active.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EA tool we use dubbed \u201cnetwork telescope\u201d captures internet background noise \u2013 traffic generated by hundreds of thousands of internet hosts worldwide. A drop in this signal can indicate an outage.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ciframe class=\u0022tc-infographic-datawrapper\u0022 style=\u0022border-width:0;\u0022 id=\u0022rmQfn\u0022 src=\u0022https:\/\/datawrapper.dwcdn.net\/rmQfn\/1\/\u0022 height=\u0022400px\u0022 width=\u0022100%\u0022 scrolling=\u0022no\u0022 frameborder=\u00220\u0022\u003E\u003C\/iframe\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EA History of Shutdowns\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe first nationwide shutdown that the Internet Outage Detection and Analysis project observed in Iran was during the \u201c\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/03068374.2020.1712889\u0022\u003EBloody November\u003C\/a\u003E\u201d uprising that happened in 2019. During that shutdown, the primary method the regime used was turning off routing announcements, which stopped all traffic between routers. This is a blunt force tool that makes the internet essentially go dark; no connectivity is possible for affected networks.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHowever, our measurement \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/ooni.org\/post\/2019-iran-internet-blackout\/#connecting-to-the-internet-from-iran\u0022\u003Ereporting showed differences\u003C\/a\u003E in signal-drop patterns among the three data sources we track. These patterns demonstrate the regime\u2019s adoption of diverse disconnection mechanisms and large differences in the timing of disconnection by various Iranian internet service providers (ISPs).\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThis reporting also showed evidence that the 2019 blackout was not complete and some people were able to circumvent it. Nevertheless, as documented by Amnesty International, the internet darkness created a \u201c\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/iran-shutdown.amnesty.org\/\u0022\u003Eweb of impunity\u003C\/a\u003E\u201d that allowed the regime to violate international human rights law without any accountability.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn September 2022, the Women, Life, Freedom protests erupted after the killing of Mahsa Amini in state custody. To suppress the nationwide mobilization without exacting a high cost, the Iranian regime implemented \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu\/reports\/technical-multi-stakeholder-report-on-internet-shutdowns-the-case-of-iran-amid-autumn-2022-protests\/\u0022\u003Enightly shutdowns affecting only mobile networks\u003C\/a\u003E. Keeping fixed-line internet connections online limited the impact of these shutdowns to mitigate the economic, political and social costs.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThese nightly internet curfews lasted about two weeks. During this time the regime implemented other forms of censorship, specifically blocking applications to further control the information environment and to prevent access to technologies for circumventing censorship.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn June 2025, the Israel-Iran war began and \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/youtu.be\/jbC5bDV-rnA?si=twSnL8M7azOmj0Hn\u0026amp;t=73\u0022\u003Ewe observed\u003C\/a\u003E initial degradation in internet connectivity, which often occurs during times of conflict, when internet and power infrastructure are affected by missile attacks. The Iranian regime shut down the internet over four days, citing national security as its rationale.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThat time, the regime did not use routing announcements to implement the shutdown. Our measurement data shows that routing announcements were largely unaffected. Instead, the Iranian regime implemented the shutdown by interfering with key protocols that allow the internet to function, including \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.internetsociety.org\/deploy360\/tls\/basics\/\u0022\u003Etransport layer security\u003C\/a\u003E and the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/what-is-dns-a-computer-engineer-explains-this-foundational-piece-of-the-web-and-why-its-the-internets-achilles-heel-268336\u0022\u003Edomain name system\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe regime used these techniques to shut off Iran\u2019s connectivity with the global internet while allowing specific, sanctioned access in a policy called whitelisting. This strategy shows an increased sophistication in how the Iranian regime implements shutdowns and controls the flow of information.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOrganizations that support digital human rights in Iran report that some Iranians were \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/10\/02\/irans-stealth-blackout-a-multi-stakeholder-analysis-of-the-june-2025-internet-shutdown\/\u0022\u003Eable to circumvent the shutdown\u003C\/a\u003E using virtual private networks and various censorship-resilient technologies such as \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/technology\/P2P\u0022\u003Epeer-to-peer networks\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cfigure\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ciframe width=\u0022440\u0022 height=\u0022260\u0022 src=\u0022https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/2Yaoqdw2cwg?wmode=transparent\u0026amp;start=0\u0022 frameborder=\u00220\u0022 allowfullscreen=\u0022\u0022\u003E\u003C\/iframe\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cfigcaption\u003E\u003Cspan class=\u0022caption\u0022\u003EThe Iranian regime has targeted Starlink satellite internet service in its internet shutdown.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/figcaption\u003E\u003C\/figure\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EJan. 8, 2026\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOn Dec. 30, 2025, the Internet Outage Detection and Analysis project team received reports of internet disruptions amid the start of nationwide protests. At 8 p.m. Iran Standard Time on Jan. 8, 2026, the Iranian regime shut down the internet. Our measurements \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu\/country\/IR?from=1765814823\u0026amp;until=1768406823\u0026amp;view=view1\u0022\u003Eshow a nominal amount of responsiveness\u003C\/a\u003E to our active probing, about 3%. This small amount could be an artifact of our measurements or lingering connectivity for whitelisted access, for example for Iranian government officials and services.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOutside of very limited whitelisted connectivity, digital human rights groups reported severely limited access to the internet both internationally and domestically. According to digital rights group \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/ainita.net\/\u0022\u003EProject Ainita\u003C\/a\u003E, the Iranian regime implemented the shutdown by interfering with transport layer security and the domain name system. In addition, landline phone calls have been only intermittently available.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAside from these more sophisticated techniques, this shutdown evokes the Bloody November shutdown of 2019 in that it has been ordered during a time of protest \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.en-hrana.org\/day-seventeen-of-irans-protests-continued-internet-shutdown-spike-in-figures-and-intensifying-global-reactions\/\u0022\u003Ewith mass civilian casualties\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EJammed Satellites\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESince Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, low Earth orbit satellite services, such as Starlink, can help people maintain internet connectivity during outages and government-ordered shutdowns. These satellite services can allow users to bypass damaged or state-censored terrestrial internet infrastructure.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHowever, accessing the internet via satellite services during a shutdown is not without risk. User terminals communicate with satellites via radio frequency links that can be detected through surveillance, for example from planes or drones, potentially exposing users\u2019 locations and putting them at risk of being identified. Currently, the Iranian regime is using jammers to \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2026\/01\/13\/network-monitoring-january-2025-internet-repression-in-times-of-protest\/\u0022\u003Edegrade the Starlink connection\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOne of the most significant barriers to connecting users in Iran to satellite services is a logistical one. Providing connectivity via Starlink\u2019s service would require distributing a large number of user terminals within the country, a feat that would be difficult because the devices are likely to be considered illegal contraband by the government. This severely limits the scale at which such services can be adopted.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERecent technological developments, however, may partially mitigate this challenge. Starlink\u2019s \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/starlink.com\/business\/direct-to-cell\u0022\u003Edirect-to-cell\u003C\/a\u003E capability, which aims to provide LTE cellular connectivity directly to ordinary cellphones, could reduce dependence on specialized hardware. If they become widely available, such systems would allow users to connect using common devices already in circulation, sidestepping one of the most difficult barriers to providing connectivity.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELike other radio-based communications, however, direct-to-cell connectivity would remain \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/01\/15\/technology\/iran-online-starlink.html\u0022\u003Evulnerable to signal jamming\u003C\/a\u003E and other forms of electronic interference by the government.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFor the time being, the Iranian regime controls the country\u2019s internet infrastructure, which means it still has a virtual off switch.\u003C!-- Below is The Conversation\u0027s page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --\u003E\u003Cimg style=\u0022border-color:!important;border-style:none;box-shadow:none !important;margin:0 !important;max-height:1px !important;max-width:1px !important;min-height:1px !important;min-width:1px !important;opacity:0 !important;outline:none !important;padding:0 !important;\u0022 src=\u0022https:\/\/counter.theconversation.com\/content\/273439\/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic\u0022 alt=\u0022The Conversation\u0022 width=\u00221\u0022 height=\u00221\u0022 referrerpolicy=\u0022no-referrer-when-downgrade\u0022\u003E\u003C!-- End of code. If you don\u0027t see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https:\/\/theconversation.com\/republishing-guidelines --\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThis article is republished from \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThe Conversation\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cem\u003E under a Creative Commons license. Read the \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/irans-latest-internet-blackout-extends-to-phones-and-starlink-273439\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003Eoriginal article\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cem\u003E.\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E","summary":"","format":"full_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003EThe Iranian regime\u2019s internet shutdown, initiated on Jan. 8, 2026, has severely diminished the flow of information out of the country.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"The Iranian regime\u2019s internet shutdown, initiated on Jan. 8, 2026, has severely diminished the flow of information out of the country. "}],"uid":"27469","created_gmt":"2026-01-16 13:52:41","changed_gmt":"2026-04-13 15:34:26","author":"Kristen Bailey","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","location":"Atlanta, GA","dateline":{"date":"2026-01-16T00:00:00-05:00","iso_date":"2026-01-16T00:00:00-05:00","tz":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"hg_media":{"679144":{"id":"679144","type":"image","title":"Protesters have filled the streets in Iranian cities, but the regime\u2019s internet shutdown means little news gets in or out of the country. MAHSA\/Middle East Images\/AFP via Getty Images","body":"\u003Cp\u003EProtesters have filled the streets in Iranian cities, but the regime\u2019s internet shutdown means little news gets in or out of the country. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/iranians-gather-while-blocking-a-street-during-a-protest-in-news-photo\/2254948920\u0022\u003EMAHSA\/Middle East Images\/AFP via Getty Images\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E","created":"1770040671","gmt_created":"2026-02-02 13:57:51","changed":"1770040671","gmt_changed":"2026-02-02 13:57:51","alt":"Protesters have filled the streets in Iranian cities, but the regime\u2019s internet shutdown means little news gets in or out of the country. MAHSA\/Middle East Images\/AFP via Getty Images","file":{"fid":"263267","name":"file-20260114-66-h9x7xx.jpg","image_path":"\/sites\/default\/files\/2026\/02\/02\/file-20260114-66-h9x7xx.jpg","image_full_path":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/\/sites\/default\/files\/2026\/02\/02\/file-20260114-66-h9x7xx.jpg","mime":"image\/jpeg","size":519973,"path_740":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/740xx_scale\/public\/2026\/02\/02\/file-20260114-66-h9x7xx.jpg?itok=4IKLToyJ"}}},"media_ids":["679144"],"related_links":[{"url":"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/irans-latest-internet-blackout-extends-to-phones-and-starlink-273439","title":"Read This Article on The Conversation"}],"groups":[{"id":"47223","name":"College of Computing"},{"id":"658168","name":"Experts"},{"id":"1214","name":"News Room"},{"id":"1188","name":"Research Horizons"}],"categories":[],"keywords":[{"id":"187915","name":"go-researchnews"},{"id":"194974","name":"go-theconversation"}],"core_research_areas":[],"news_room_topics":[{"id":"71881","name":"Science and Technology"}],"event_categories":[],"invited_audience":[],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[{"value":"\u003Ch5\u003EAuthors:\u003C\/h5\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/amanda-meng-2566155\u0022\u003EAmanda Meng\u003C\/a\u003E, Senior Research Scientist, College of Computing, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/georgia-institute-of-technology-1310\u0022\u003EGeorgia Institute of Technology\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/alberto-dainotti-2566173\u0022\u003EAlberto Dainotti\u003C\/a\u003E, Associate Professor of Computer Science, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/georgia-institute-of-technology-1310\u0022\u003EGeorgia Institute of Technology\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/zachary-bischof-2566170\u0022\u003EZachary Bischof\u003C\/a\u003E, Senior Research Scientist, College of Computing, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/georgia-institute-of-technology-1310\u0022\u003EGeorgia Institute of Technology\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch5\u003EMedia Contact:\u003C\/h5\u003E\u003Cp\u003EShelley Wunder-Smith\u003Cbr\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022mailto:shelley.wunder-smith@research.gatech.edu\u0022\u003Eshelley.wunder-smith@research.gatech.edu\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"email":[],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}