{"683264":{"#nid":"683264","#data":{"type":"news","title":" How the World\u2019s Nuclear Watchdog Monitors Facilities Around the World \u2013 and What it Means That Iran Kicked it Out","body":[{"value":"\u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhat happens when a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program? Every peaceful program starts with a promise not to build a nuclear weapon. Then, the global community verifies that stated intent via the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/disarmament.unoda.org\/wmd\/nuclear\/npt\/\u0022\u003ETreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOnce a country signs the treaty, the world\u2019s nuclear watchdog, the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/\u0022\u003EInternational Atomic Energy Agency\u003C\/a\u003E, provides continuous and technical proof that the country\u2019s nuclear program is peaceful.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe IAEA ensures that countries operate their programs within the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/topics\/safeguards-legal-framework\/more-on-safeguards-agreements\u0022\u003Elimits of nonproliferation agreements\u003C\/a\u003E: low enrichment and no reactor misuse. Part of the agreement allows the IAEA to \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/topics\/additional-protocol\u0022\u003Einspect nuclear-related sites\u003C\/a\u003E, including unannounced surprise visits.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThese are not just log reviews. Inspectors know what should and should not be there. When the IAEA is not on site, cameras, tamper-revealing seals on equipment and real-time radiation monitors are working full-time to gather or verify inside information about the program\u2019s activities.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003ESafeguards Toolkit\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe IAEA safeguards toolkit is designed to detect proliferation activities early. Much of the work is fairly technical. The safeguards toolkit combines physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics and scientific sampling. Inspectors are chemists, physicists and nuclear engineers. They count spent fuel rods in a cooling pond. They check tamper seals on centrifuges. Often, the inspectors walk miles through hallways and corridors carrying heavy equipment.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThat\u2019s how the world learned in April 2021 about Iran pushing uranium enrichment from reactor-fuel-grade to near-weapons-grade levels. IAEA inspectors were \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/govinf2021-26.pdf\u0022\u003Eable to verify\u003C\/a\u003E that Iran was feeding uranium into a series of centrifuges designed to enrich the uranium from 5%, used for energy programs, to 60%, which is a step toward the 90% level used in nuclear weapons.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAround the facilities, whether for uranium enrichment or plutonium processing, closed-circuit surveillance cameras monitor for undeclared materials or post-work activities. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/news\/new-seals-to-verify-the-use-of-nuclear-material-and-technology-demonstrated-at-iaea-general-conference\u0022\u003ESeals around the facilities\u003C\/a\u003E provide evidence that uranium gas cylinders have not been tampered with or that centrifuges operate at the declared levels. Beyond seals, online enrichment monitors allow inspectors to look inside of centrifuges for any changes in the declared enrichment process.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESeals verify whether nuclear equipment or materials have been used between onsite inspections.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhen the inspectors are on-site, they collect environmental swipes: \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/news\/swipe-check-collecting-and-analysing-environmental-samples-nuclear-verification\u0022\u003Esamples of nuclear materials on surfaces\u003C\/a\u003E, in dust or in the air. These can reveal if uranium has been enriched to levels beyond those allowed by the agreement. Or if plutonium, which is not used in nuclear power plants, is being produced in a reactor. Swipes are precise. They can identify enrichment levels from a particle smaller than a speck of dust. But they take time, days or weeks. Inspectors analyze the samples at the IAEA\u2019s laboratories using sophisticated equipment called mass spectrometers.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn addition to physical samples, IAEA inspectors look at the logs of material inventories. They look for diversion of uranium or plutonium from normal process lines, just like accountants trace the flow of finances, except that their verification is supported by the ever-watching online monitors and radiation sensors. They also \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/topics\/verification-and-other-safeguards-activities\u0022\u003Ecount items of interest\u003C\/a\u003E and weigh them for additional verification of the logs.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBeyond accounting for materials, IAEA inspectors verify that the facility \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/topics\/verification-and-other-safeguards-activities\u0022\u003Ematches the declared design\u003C\/a\u003E. For example, if a country is expanding centrifuge halls to increase its enrichment capabilities, that\u2019s a red flag. Changes to the layout of material processing laboratories near nuclear reactors could be a sign that the program is preparing to produce unauthorized plutonium.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003ELosing Access\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIran announced on June 28, 2025, that it has \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/iran-ban-iaea-chief-rafael-grossi-surveillance-camera-nuclear-plant\/\u0022\u003Eended its cooperation with the IAEA\u003C\/a\u003E. It removed the monitoring devices, including surveillance cameras, from centrifuge halls. This move followed the news by the IAEA that Iran\u2019s enrichment activities are well outside of allowed levels. Iran now operates \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/why-the-us-bombed-a-bunch-of-metal-tubes-a-nuclear-engineer-explains-the-importance-of-centrifuges-to-iranian-efforts-to-build-nuclear-weapons-259883\u0022\u003Esophisticated uranium centrifuges\u003C\/a\u003E, like models IR-6 and IR-9.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERemoving IAEA access means that the international community loses insight into how quickly Iran\u2019s program can accumulate weapon-grade uranium, or how much it has produced. Also lost is information about whether the facility is undergoing changes for proliferation purposes. These processes are difficult to detect with external surveillance, like satellites, alone.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/680796\/original\/file-20250717-56-yh9yjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0\u0026amp;q=45\u0026amp;auto=format\u0026amp;w=1000\u0026amp;fit=clip\u0022\u003E\u003Cimg src=\u0022https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/680796\/original\/file-20250717-56-yh9yjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0\u0026amp;q=45\u0026amp;auto=format\u0026amp;w=754\u0026amp;fit=clip\u0022 alt=\u0022a satellite view of a complex of buidlings on a desert landscape\u0022\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cbr\u003EA satellite view of Iran\u2019s Arak Nuclear Complex, which has a reactor capable of producing plutonium. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/maxar-satellite-imagery-shows-the-arak-heavy-water-reactor-news-photo\/2220199432\u0022\u003ESatellite image (c) 2025 Maxar Technologies via Getty Images\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAn alternative to the uranium enrichment path for producing nuclear weapons material is plutonium. Plutonium can\u2019t be mined, it has to be produced in a nuclear reactor. Iran built a reactor \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/isis-online.org\/uploads\/isis-reports\/documents\/Plutonium_Pathway_Final.pdf\u0022\u003Ecapable of producing plutonium\u003C\/a\u003E, the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor at the \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.nti.org\/education-center\/facilities\/arak-nuclear-complex\/\u0022\u003EArak Nuclear Complex\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIran modified the Arak reactor under the now-defunct \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/question\/What-is-the-Iran-nuclear-deal-and-why-was-it-scrapped\u0022\u003EJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u003C\/a\u003E to make plutonium production less likely. During the June 2025 missile attacks, \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/defence-blog.com\/israel-hits-irans-arak-reactor\/\u0022\u003EIsrael targeted Arak\u2019s facilities\u003C\/a\u003E with the aim of eliminating the possibility of plutonium production.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWith IAEA access suspended, it won\u2019t be possible to see what happens inside the facility. Can the reactor be used for plutonium production? Although a lengthier process than the uranium enrichment path, plutonium provides a parallel path to uranium enrichment for developing nuclear weapons.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch2\u003EContinuity of Knowledge\u003C\/h2\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENorth Korea \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/pressreleases\/iaea-inspectors-depart-dprk\u0022\u003Eexpelled IAEA inspectors\u003C\/a\u003E in 2009. Within a few years, they \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/posts\/2021\/09\/what-the-restarting-of-north-koreas-yongbyon-reactor-means?lang=en\u0022\u003Erestarted activities\u003C\/a\u003E related to uranium enrichment and plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor. The international community\u2019s information about North Korea\u2019s weapons program now relies solely on external methods: satellite images, radioactive particles like xenon \u2013 airborne fingerprints of nuclear activities \u2013 and seismic data.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhat is lost is the continuity of the knowledge, a chain of verification over time. Once the seals are broken or cameras are removed, that chain is lost, and so is confidence about what is happening at the facilities.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhen it comes to IAEA inspections, there is no single tool that paints the whole picture. Surveillance plus sampling plus accounting provide validation and confidence. Losing even one weakens the system in the long term.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe existing safeguards regime is meant to detect violations. The countries that sign the nonproliferation treaty know that they are always watched, and that plays a deterrence role. The inspectors can\u2019t just resume the verification activities after some time if access is lost. Future access won\u2019t necessarily enable inspectors to clarify what happened during the gap.\u003C!-- Below is The Conversation\u0027s page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --\u003E\u003Cimg src=\u0022https:\/\/counter.theconversation.com\/content\/260689\/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic\u0022 alt=\u0022The Conversation\u0022 width=\u00221\u0022 height=\u00221\u0022\u003E\u003C!-- End of code. If you don\u0027t see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https:\/\/theconversation.com\/republishing-guidelines --\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThis article is republished from \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThe Conversation\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cem\u003E under a Creative Commons license. Read the \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/how-the-worlds-nuclear-watchdog-monitors-facilities-around-the-world-and-what-it-means-that-iran-kicked-it-out-260689\u0022\u003E\u003Cem\u003Eoriginal article\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cem\u003E.\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E","summary":"","format":"full_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003EWhat happens when a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program?\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"What happens when a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program?"}],"uid":"27469","created_gmt":"2025-07-24 17:48:38","changed_gmt":"2025-12-31 16:40:29","author":"Kristen Bailey","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","location":"Atlanta, GA","dateline":{"date":"2025-07-20T00:00:00-04:00","iso_date":"2025-07-20T00:00:00-04:00","tz":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"hg_media":{"677480":{"id":"677480","type":"image","title":"This travel case holds a toolkit containing equipment for inspecting nuclear facilities","body":"\u003Cp\u003EThis travel case holds a toolkit containing equipment for inspecting nuclear facilities. \u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/iaea_imagebank\/30483028477\/\u0022\u003EDean Calma\/IAEA\u003C\/a\u003E, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/\u0022\u003ECC BY\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E","created":"1753379503","gmt_created":"2025-07-24 17:51:43","changed":"1753379503","gmt_changed":"2025-07-24 17:51:43","alt":"This travel case holds a toolkit containing equipment for inspecting nuclear facilities","file":{"fid":"261382","name":"file-20250717-56-7a42gj.jpg","image_path":"\/sites\/default\/files\/2025\/07\/24\/file-20250717-56-7a42gj.jpg","image_full_path":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/\/sites\/default\/files\/2025\/07\/24\/file-20250717-56-7a42gj.jpg","mime":"image\/jpeg","size":313068,"path_740":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/740xx_scale\/public\/2025\/07\/24\/file-20250717-56-7a42gj.jpg?itok=oZugr_QX"}}},"media_ids":["677480"],"related_links":[{"url":"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/how-the-worlds-nuclear-watchdog-monitors-facilities-around-the-world-and-what-it-means-that-iran-kicked-it-out-260689","title":"Read This Article on The Conversation"}],"groups":[{"id":"1188","name":"Research Horizons"},{"id":"367481","name":"SEI Energy"},{"id":"1280","name":"Strategic Energy Institute"}],"categories":[{"id":"144","name":"Energy"}],"keywords":[{"id":"187915","name":"go-researchnews"},{"id":"186858","name":"go-sei"}],"core_research_areas":[{"id":"39531","name":"Energy and Sustainable Infrastructure"},{"id":"193652","name":"Matter and Systems"}],"news_room_topics":[{"id":"71881","name":"Science and Technology"}],"event_categories":[],"invited_audience":[],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[{"value":"\u003Ch5\u003EAuthor:\u003C\/h5\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/anna-erickson-2420881\u0022\u003EAnna Erickson\u003C\/a\u003E, professor of Nuclear and Radiological Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Ch5\u003EMedia Contact:\u003C\/h5\u003E\u003Cp\u003EShelley Wunder-Smith\u003Cbr\u003E\u003Ca href=\u0022mailto:shelley.wunder-smith@research.gatech.edu\u0022\u003Eshelley.wunder-smith@research.gatech.edu\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E","format":"limited_html"}],"email":[],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}