{"639543":{"#nid":"639543","#data":{"type":"event","title":"Ph.D. Dissertation Defense - Haider Khan","body":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003ETitle\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003Cem\u003E:\u0026nbsp; \u003C\/em\u003E\u003Cem\u003ESide-Channel Signal Analysis for Securing Embedded and Cyber-Physical Systems\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003ECommittee:\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003EDr. Alenka Zajic, ECE, Chair , Advisor\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003EDr. Milos Prvulovic, CS, Co-Advisor\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003EDr. Morris Cohen, ECE\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003EDr. David Anderson, ECE\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003EDr. Azadeh Ansari, ECE\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003EDr. Alessandro Orso, CS\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EAbstract: \u003C\/strong\u003ESide-channels cause unintentional information leakage as a side-effect of hardware activity due to legitimate program execution. While attackers have traditionally exploited side-channel analysis for extracting sensitive information from target systems, recent research has utilized side-channels for non-adversarial monitoring of program execution. This approach can be especially useful for securing resource-constrained security-critical embedded systems.\u0026nbsp;This thesis develops methods that leverage electromagnetic (EM) side-channel signals for non-adversarial and non-intrusive monitoring of embedded and cyber-physical systems. Our research provides techniques for identifying anomalous\/malicious program behavior by detecting deviations in EM emanations and presents a framework for end-to-end basic-block program execution tracking by monitoring the device\u0026#39;s EM side-channel signal. In this thesis, we 1) designed an intrusion detection system that learns a dictionary of reference EM signatures and exploits the dictionary for identifying anomalous\/malicious program behavior, 2) designed neural network to model the monitored device\u0026#39;s EM side-channel signal and detect stealthy malware activities through deviations in EM emanations, 3) designed a novel framework that performs basic-block program execution tracing by monitoring device\u0026#39;s EM side-channel signal, and 4) demonstrated that even a single instruction deviation in program execution can be detected with high accuracy via EM side-channel signals captured by a readily available measurement device.\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n","summary":null,"format":"limited_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":"","field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"Side-Channel Signal Analysis for Securing Embedded and Cyber-Physical Systems "}],"uid":"28475","created_gmt":"2020-09-24 20:13:18","changed_gmt":"2020-09-24 20:13:18","author":"Daniela Staiculescu","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","field_event_time":{"event_time_start":"2020-10-05T13:00:00-04:00","event_time_end":"2020-10-05T15:00:00-04:00","event_time_end_last":"2020-10-05T15:00:00-04:00","gmt_time_start":"2020-10-05 17:00:00","gmt_time_end":"2020-10-05 19:00:00","gmt_time_end_last":"2020-10-05 19:00:00","rrule":null,"timezone":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"groups":[{"id":"434381","name":"ECE Ph.D. Dissertation Defenses"}],"categories":[],"keywords":[{"id":"100811","name":"Phd Defense"},{"id":"1808","name":"graduate students"}],"core_research_areas":[],"news_room_topics":[],"event_categories":[{"id":"1788","name":"Other\/Miscellaneous"}],"invited_audience":[{"id":"78771","name":"Public"}],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[],"email":[],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}