{"594030":{"#nid":"594030","#data":{"type":"event","title":"PhD Defense by James Bailey","body":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nTitle: The Price of Deception in Social Choice\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nTime: Friday, August 4th, 2017, 2pm\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nLocation: Groseclose 402\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nAdvisor: Dr. Craig Tovey, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nCommittee:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nDr. Paul Griffin, School of Industrial Engineering, Purdue University\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nDr. Santosh Vempala, School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nof Technology\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nDr. Vijay Vazirani, School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nof Technology\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nDr. Prasad Tetali, School of Mathematics, Georgia Institute of Technology\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nReader: Dr. J\u0026ouml;rg Rothe, Institute for Computer Science, University of\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nD\u0026uuml;sseldorf\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nThe thesis is available for public inspection in the School of Mathematics\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nlounge (Skiles 236), the ARC lounge (Klaus 2222), the ISyE PhD student\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nlounge and at the URL\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/aco.gatech.edu\/events\/final-doctoral-examination-and-\u0022 target=\u0022_blank\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/aco.gatech.edu\/events\/final-doctoral-examination-and-\u003C\/a\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\ndefense-dissertation-james-bailey\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nSummary:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nMost social choice algorithms rely on private data from individuals to\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nmaximize a social utility. However, many algorithms are manipulable \u0026ndash; an\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nindividual can manipulate her reported data to obtain an outcome she\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nprefers often at the cost of social good. Literature addresses this by\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\ndeclaring an algorithm as \u0026ldquo;manipulable\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;strategy-proof\u0026rdquo;. However, for\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nmany decision we are forced to either use a manipulable algorithm or an\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nalgorithm with negative properties; for instance, a dictatorship is the\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nonly reasonably strategy-proof way to decide an election. Thus, we view it\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nas unwise to take an all-or-nothing approach to manipulation since we often\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nhave to settle for nothing.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nIn this dissertation, we focus on algorithmic design with strategic\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nbehavior in mind. Specifically we develop the framework to examine the\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\neffect of manipulation on social choice using a game theoretic model. Our\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nmodel of human behavior is supported by an extensive amount of experimental\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nevidence and psychology and economics and allows us to better understand\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nthe likely outcomes of strategic behavior. We introduce a measure of\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nmanipulation \u0026ndash; the Price of Deception \u0026ndash; that quantifies the impact of\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nmanipulation. With the Price of Deception we are able to identify\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nalgorithms are negligibly impacted by manipulation, algorithms where\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nstrategic behavior leads to arbitrarily poor outcomes, and anything\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nin-between. We prove the power of our model and the Price of Deception by\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nanswering open problems in assignments, facility location, election and\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nstable marriage including a 28-year open problem by Gusfield and Irving.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\nOur results demonstrate that the Price of Deception, like computational\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\ncomplexity, provides finer distinctions of manipulability than between\u003Cbr \/\u003E\r\n\u0026ldquo;yes\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;no\u0026rdquo;.\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n\r\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\r\n","summary":null,"format":"limited_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":"","field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"The Price of Deception in Social Choice"}],"uid":"27707","created_gmt":"2017-08-03 12:59:23","changed_gmt":"2017-08-03 12:59:23","author":"Tatianna Richardson","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","field_event_time":{"event_time_start":"2017-08-04T15:00:00-04:00","event_time_end":"2017-08-04T17:00:00-04:00","event_time_end_last":"2017-08-04T17:00:00-04:00","gmt_time_start":"2017-08-04 19:00:00","gmt_time_end":"2017-08-04 21:00:00","gmt_time_end_last":"2017-08-04 21:00:00","rrule":null,"timezone":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"groups":[{"id":"221981","name":"Graduate Studies"}],"categories":[],"keywords":[{"id":"100811","name":"Phd Defense"}],"core_research_areas":[],"news_room_topics":[],"event_categories":[{"id":"1788","name":"Other\/Miscellaneous"}],"invited_audience":[{"id":"78771","name":"Public"}],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[],"email":[],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}