Excerpt:

Consider a 2014 study by Jenna Jordan of the Georgia Institute of Technology on so-called decapitation strikes against major terrorist groups. On the death of al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden, she writes, “decapitation is unlikely to diminish the ability of al-Qaida, rather, it may have counterproductive consequences, emboldening or strengthening the organization.”

She bases her claim on the theory of “organizational resilience,” which may be more familiar to business school graduates than to counterterrorism operatives. Jordan doesn't buy the argument that a cohesive group sharing an intense belief in a goal depends on the “charismatic leadership” (to use Max Weber's phrase) of a single person like bin Laden or Baghdadi. Instead, she sees many clandestine groups as being bureaucracies often impervious to changes at the top. Such organizations “are diversified, have a clear division of administrative responsibilities and functions, follow rules and procedures, and are thus more likely to withstand the sudden removal of a leader or leaders.” All of those characteristics apply far more accurately to Islamic State than to the relatively decentralized al-Qaida.

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