Before dawn on March 1, 2026, Iranian Shahed drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centers in the United Arab Emirates. A third commercial data center in Bahrain was hit, though it is less clear whether it was deliberately targeted. This is the first time that a country has deliberately targeted commercial data centers during wartime.

Iran state media issued a statement on March 31 that it will target American companies, including Microsoft, Google, Apple, Meta, Oracle, Intel, HP, IBM, Cisco, Dell, Palantir and Nvidia. The Financial Times reported that an additional Iranian drone struck an Amazon data center in Bahrain on April 1. And Iranian state media claimed that Iranian forces attacked an Oracle data center in Dubai on April 2.

Iran has also been on the receiving end of such attacks. A data center in Tehran operated by Iran’s state-run Bank Sepah was struck by a missile – apparently fired by U.S. or Israeli forces – on March 11, according to a report in The Jerusalem Post.

Data centers have been targets of espionage and cyberattacks in the past, notably when Ukrainian hackers destroyed data stored in a Russian military-affiliated data center in 2024. These strikes in the Persian Gulf region, however, were physical attacks. Drones damaged buildings.

Advances in artificial intelligence have increased the importance of data centers. The U.S. military, in particular, has made great use of AI systems for decision support in its attacks on Iran and Venezuela. Given how important data centers are, Iranian forces could be targeting the infrastructure Iran’s leaders believe is supporting strikes on Iran.

It is not altogether clear that these particular data centers were used by the U.S. military. Instead, the attacks may have been part of a broader effort to punish the United Arab Emirates for its ties with the U.S.

In my experience as a Ph.D. candidate at Georgia Tech studying how technology drives changes in international security, I don’t think the attacks signal any significant change in the nature of warfare. But they are forcing nations to recognize that data centers are targets of war – even if they don’t directly support military operations.

Data Centers and the Cloud

The United States military is increasingly incorporating advanced AI capabilities into its decision support systems. From the operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to supporting military strikes against Iran, the U.S. has been using AI, especially Anthropic’s Claude, for intelligence analysis and operational support.

AI is unlocking faster ways to carry out operations in war, but the AI tools the military often uses are not located on a plane or ship. When a service member uses Claude, the computing infrastructure that powers the model and its analysis usually goes to a secure Amazon Web Services cloud that hosts secret government data and software tools.

Commercial data centers are where the cloud lives. The next time you pull up Netflix and watch your favorite shows, you are likely streaming the programming from a data center, possibly AWS. When AWS data centers go down, outages affect all sorts of entertainment, news and government functions.

With AI as a driver of economic growth, data centers are key forms of infrastructure. They ensure that AI can continue to run, as well as much of the underlying internet that governments and industry rely on. When Iran attacked the UAE’s data centers, it caused widespread disruption to the local banking system.

Commercial data centers enable most of the technology that runs the modern world, including AI systems. Disrupting them is key to disrupting a country’s military and society. Given that AWS provides and operates many of the commercial data centers where the cloud lives, it is likely that its data centers will continue to be targeted in conflict.

Going After US Allies

Researchers at Just Security noted on March 12, 2026, that the United States requires cloud-computing service providers to store government and military data within the U.S. or on Department of Defense bases: “Moving such data to Amazon data centers in the Gulf region would require special authorization; we are unaware if that has been granted.”

Nevertheless, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed the strikes were against data centers supporting “the enemy’s” military and intelligence activities. And 10 days after the initial attack on the data centers, an Iranian news agency claimed that major tech company data centers and other physical assets in the region were considered “enemy technology infrastructure.”

Instead of military reasons, Iran may well have targeted the UAE to rattle the global economy and garner attention. Given the prominence of the Gulf as a major recipient of U.S. technological investment, the attack may also have been a symbolic one aimed at the heart of U.S.-Gulf cooperation. AI infrastructure such as commercial data centers is a growing part of U.S. leadership in the region, and this war could jeopardize the future of AI infrastructure in the Gulf.

Growing Importance, Easy Targets

Though data centers are increasingly important for national security, the economy and society at large, it can be tempting to suggest these strikes represent a fundamental shift in the nature of war. While that is a possibility, it is important to remember that Iran launched thousands of missiles and drones at targets in the UAE and Bahrain. Though the vast majority were intercepted, the four that struck data centers are a small portion of the ones that got through to civilian targets in those countries, including strikes on airports and hotels.

The relative vulnerability of commercial data centers – they are large, relatively fragile and lack dedicated air defenses – suggests that the ones in the UAE and Bahrain may have been targets of opportunity or convenience. In other words, they were hit because they could be hit.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that as the use of AI tools and other cloud-based resources continues to grow in importance for countries around the world, commercial data centers will be targets in future conflicts.

This article has been updated to include news of Iran’s statement about targeting U.S. tech companies and subsequent drone strikes on other data centers.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Work on your character, be honest with yourself, and never stop reading. That was the advice from retired U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal at a recent fireside chat in the John Lewis Student Center’s Walter Ehmer Theater. 

He will be joined by the Honorable John Tien, former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and Nunn School Distinguished Professor of the Practice, for a fireside chat to discuss his book On Character: Choices that Define a Life.

Together, they will explore the insights found within its pages and examine the lessons learned from a lifetime of service.

After a career of service, retired four-star general Stanley McChrystal had much to contemplate. He pondered his successes and failures, his beliefs and aspirations, and asked himself, "Who am I, really? And more importantly, who have I become? When I die, how will I be measured?"

In the end, McChrystal came to a conclusion as simple as it was profound: the reality of who we are cannot be recorded in dates or accomplishments. It is found in our character—the most accurate, and last full measure, of who we choose to be.    

On Character offers McChrystal’s blueprint for living with purpose and integrity, challenging us to examine not just our deeds but who we become through them. Drawing from a lifetime of experience, he distills profound insights on setting and meeting standards, aligning actions with beliefs, and offers practical advice on overcoming obstacles and pursuing self-improvement.    

According to McChrystal, character is not a trait inherited at birth, nor does it automatically come from education, position, or experience. Character, instead, comes down to a succession of choices, most mundane, several momentous, that reveal the deep truth of our capacity for virtue.    

In an era where understanding and upholding our ideals is more crucial than ever, On Character offers an inspiring roadmap for personal growth and integrity—a call to become our best selves, both as individuals and as Americans.

Registration required.

Reliable energy is required to keep safe in cold winters and hot summers, making it a matter of national security. There are also vying economic policies to consider, political and financial incentives to navigate, and questions of social and economic inequality.

Experts in Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts examine the challenges we face with the U.S. energy transition, and work to help make it safe, fair, and effective for all.

• Challenge No. 1: Managing National Security — with Adam N. Stulberg, professor and chair of the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs.
• Challenge No. 2: Confronting Inequality — with Bijesh Mishra, a postdoctoral scholar in the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School of Public Policy.
• Challenge No. 3: Choosing the Right Economic Policies — with Bobby Harris, an assistant professor in the School of Economics.
• Challenge No. 4: Navigating Financial and Political Incentives — with Kate Pride Brown, a sociologist in the School of History and Sociology.

Read the article on the Ivan Allen College website.

Amid all the excitement, researchers at the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts are also leveraging the "world’s game" as a sophisticated lens for understanding and advancing global development.

In his recent edited book, Soccer, Globalization, and Innovation, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs Professor and Regents’ Entrepreneur Kirk Bowman argues that soccer provides a unique "contested space" to show how communities can use innovation and collective action to achieve unexpected outcomes.

For instance, soccer’s global dominance is often attributed to practices such as the system of promoting and relegating teams to higher or lower leagues based on their performance, its unique way of using single-elimination tournaments to create drama, and the evolution of the fluid and aggressive “total football” style of play. 

“Why is football the people’s game with 4 billion fans?  It’s because of these and other innovations,” Bowman said.

For more about the book and global development at Georgia Tech, read the full story.

If history tells us anything, it’s the right place at the right time.  

“This team steps into a void,” said Declan Abernethy, lecturer in Georgia Tech’s School of History and Sociology. “It’s nice to see women’s soccer be valued as a commercial spectacle and exciting for fans in Atlanta.” 

Atlanta holds a place in women’s soccer history as host of the 1996 Summer Olympics, where the U.S. Women’s National Team won its first gold medal — the introduction to women’s soccer for many Americans. 

Since then, the soccer ecosystem has expanded exponentially, in Atlanta and beyond. Atlanta United began playing in 2017, winning the MLS Cup in its second year as a franchise.  

The Business of Soccer 

Arthur Blank, who owns Atlanta United and the Atlanta Falcons and purchased the rights for the new women’s team, paid $165 million for this expansion team. Just two years ago, that cost was nearly a third. The total investment will ultimately be more than $330 million. But as Abernethy points out, the purchase price and timing show that this is a serious endeavor. 

“It shows Blank is a smart business owner — he’s willing to invest in doing things the right way,” said Abernethy, who has studied and published about both Atlanta United and the U.S. Women’s National Team. “In five years, this team could be a leader in how it is run and how it spends money. We have such a strong legacy of professional women’s soccer in Atlanta and so much youth talent, it could get very competitive.”  

Why Atlanta Is Ready 

It’s not the first time a women’s soccer team has made its home in Atlanta. The Atlanta Beat played at Georgia Tech’s Bobby Dodd Stadium in the early 2000s, and the Atlanta Silverbacks Women followed.  

Since those attempts, Atlanta has welcomed a professional men’s team in Atlanta United, along with its ATL UTD 2 reserve team and extensive youth development programs. A $50 million contribution from Arthur Blank is helping build a new home for U.S. Soccer south of the city in Fayetteville with the Arthur M. Blank U.S. Soccer National Training Center. 

“It’s hitting at this opportune time with the U.S. training facility, sparks of excitement for the men’s national team, a strong run by the women’s national team with players from Atlanta, and six World Cup games being hosted in Atlanta next year. It could have a nice impact on the soccer ecosystem here,” said Kirk Bowman, Regents’ Entrepreneur and professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs in the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts.  

Bowman also points to the culture that has grown from Atlanta United and the infrastructure that supports it. Team flags adorn houses, the BeltLine and MARTA connect in-town fans to a downtown stadium that is surrounded by new development at the Gulch — not to mention a growing pool of legacy soccer players around the metro area, and the surrounding perennial success of ACC women’s soccer teams.  

“You’ve now had cohort after cohort of female soccer players of all ages, and families with mothers and daughters who have played soccer and are eager to go to games,” he said. “If they brand it correctly, there’s a lot of enthusiasm and a built-in audience that loves the game.” The WNBA also had record-high viewership last year, with its most-watched game garnering nearly 3 million viewers, demonstrating the increasing popularity of women's professional sports.

The team also enters an open market for fans, without another professional women’s team nearby. Abernethy notes that it takes time to build economic success and fandom, and with more than 50 years of women’s soccer now played, it may have finally hit its stride.

Adam N. Stulberg is the Sam Nunn Professor and School Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. He is an expert on Russian security and energy politics, contemporary great-power competition, and “gray zone” conflict in Eurasia. He previously served as a Political Consultant at RAND from 1987 to 1997 and as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey from 1997 to 1998. He has also worked closely with former Senator Sam Nunn, drafting policy recommendations and background studies on future directions for the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and on building regional and energy security regimes in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Stephan De Spiegeleire previously worked for the RAND Corporation for nearly ten years, with additional stints at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the WEU’s Institute for Security Studies. He began his career as an expert in Soviet policy before moving into work on strategic defense management, security resilience, network-centrism, capabilities-based planning, and the transformation of defense planning.

Background

The central question guiding the research was whether Russia’s frequent invocation of “red lines” represents meaningful strategic signaling, political theater, or some other form of coercive communication. By combining traditional strategic analysis with large-scale AI-driven text analysis, the project aims to move beyond the anecdotal interpretations often seen in other reporting and provide a more systematic understanding of Russian messaging.

Stulberg began with an overview of Russian “red line” messaging. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian officials such as Vladimir Putin and members of the Russian elite have repeatedly warned that Western actions could cross Russian “red lines.” However, these statements often appear inconsistent or cryptic, as well as divorced from specific nuclear threats. The term itself is used frequently but often without precise definition, and the language surrounding red lines is ambiguous and formulaic while nuclear threats appear more systematic. The statements also at times appear disconnected from actual Russian military behavior or strategic logic of deterrence and brinkmanship.

Stulberg highlighted how this creates confusion over whether such statements should be interpreted as credible deterrent threats or as rhetorical signaling. In Western strategic theory, deterrence typically relies on clarity and credibility: threats must specify what actions are prohibited and what consequences will follow. Russian statements, however, often lack this clarity (as applied to threats, ines, and consequences), making them difficult for Western policymakers to interpret. This led to the central question the researchers sought to answer about “red line” rhetoric: are these statements ineffective political theater, as they are often portrayed in Western media, or are Russian policymakers operating with a different conception of coercive diplomacy in which such statements serve a strategic function?

Western Debates

The speakers then examined the current state of Western debate regarding “red lines” and nuclear-threshold signaling, which typically draws on classical deterrence theory from thinkers such as Thomas Schelling. They identified three major schools of thought: strategic bluffs, clear and substantive threats, and calculated brinkmanship.

The “strategic bluff” school argues that Russian threats are largely bluffs. According to this view, Russia uses rhetorical escalation to deter Western involvement but has little intention of following through, and the West should therefore remain firm and continue expanding military assistance to Ukraine. The second school, “clear and substantive threats,” argues that Russian statements may signal a genuine willingness to escalate, including the potential use of nuclear weapons. This perspective emphasizes caution and restraint in order to avoid triggering escalation. The third school, “calculated brinkmanship,” argues that the threats are designed to push adversaries toward compromise while leaving room for diplomatic off-ramps. This view aligns most closely with the classical Schelling tradition of “threats that leave something to chance,” though it does not necessarily prescribe a specific course of action. The problem with all three interpretations, the speakers argued, is that they assume the Russian government is operating according to Western strategic logic, which may not be the case.

Mirror Imaging Critique

The speakers also emphasized the danger of “mirror imaging,” in which Western analysts project onto adversaries the same frameworks and incentives that guide their own decision-making. Much Western scholarship assumes that Russian leaders use red line rhetoric in the same way Western policymakers would. However, drawing on their extensive background in Soviet and Russian studies, the presenters argued that Russian strategic culture may approach coercion and signaling in fundamentally different ways. Rather than issuing clear deterrent threats, Russian messaging may intentionally blur the boundaries of escalation. This ambiguity can shape the strategic environment by influencing how opponents interpret risk and uncertainty. The question of which school of thought is correct was a significant driver of Stulberg and de Spiegeleire’s decision to build an AI model to analyze Russian statements.

Russian Coercion Methods

The presenters suggested that Russian red line rhetoric should instead be understood through the concept of “reflexive control.” Developed during the Soviet era, reflexive control is a strategic approach focused on influencing an adversary’s perceptions and decision-making processes. Rather than coercing an opponent through clear threats, the goal is to manipulate the information environment so that the opponent voluntarily chooses actions that benefit the strategist. Within this framework, ambiguity and confusion are not weaknesses but strategic tools. Russian messaging may therefore be designed to introduce uncertainty into Western decision-making, shape perceptions of escalation risk, and encourage Western restraint without requiring the credible enforcement of threats. The speakers did note, however, that based on their analysis, this strategy appears ultimately self-defeating. At the same time, Putin’s explicit nuclear saber-rattling appears more consistent with “threats that leave something to chance.”

Analytical Methodology

The second portion of the presentation, led by Stephan De Spiegeleire, focused on the technical methodology used to analyze Russian rhetoric. The research team assembled an unprecedented corpus of official Russian communications using automated scraping tools, ultimately collecting approximately 250,000 documents from 36 official Russian sources, including the Kremlin website, government agencies, and official Telegram channels.

The team then pioneered the use of large language models to analyze these texts in multiple stages. First, in an initial filtering phase, the AI system scanned document segments to identify those potentially containing Real Red Line Statements (RRLs) or Nuclear Threat Statements (NTS). The flagged sections were then classified along approximately 30 different dimensions (source, target, intensity, theme etc.). Human researchers conducted rigorous quality-control checks throughout this pipeline to validate the AI classifications.

Once completed and validated, this process yielded a searchable, curated dataset of 1,924 Red Line statements and 357 nuclear threat statements that enabled systematic analysis of Russian rhetorical patterns. To deepen the analysis, the researchers integrated this with approximately 30 heterogeneous datasets documenting the war (conflict events; diplomatic signals; sanctions; military aid; territorial control; cyber operations; equipment losses; refugee flows; etc.). The combined data, comprising over 52M rows, was transformed into a temporal knowledge graph containing 1.1 million relational “triples” representing structured relationships among entities, actions, and contexts. This dataset was then analyzed through a graph neural network with 5.1 million parameters across 210 weekly snapshots to detect patterns over time. This temporal analysis allowed the researchers to determine whether Russian rhetoric was triggered by or responded to external events. They emphasized that this method made it possible to move beyond isolated statements and instead examine the broader complex dynamics of rhetorical escalation, representing a significant advancement over previous approaches in the field.

Findings

The speakers then outlined their findings and the conclusions practitioners might draw from them. One of the most striking results was that Russian red line rhetoric appears overwhelmingly reactive rather than proactive. The statistical analysis suggested, with 99.9 percent confidence, that Russian red line statements tend to occur in response to Western actions rather than preceding them. This may indicate that RRL and NTS statements do not operate according to the typical Western understanding of coercive diplomacy, but instead function as rhetorical responses to events themselves.

The presence of RRL and NTS statements was also identified as reflecting two distinct categories within Russian rhetoric. Red Line Statements (RRLs) tend to be formulaic responses to Western political actions or military aid to Ukraine, while Nuclear Threat Statements (NTS) are more strongly correlated with Ukrainian military actions, particularly attacks on Russian territory, and appear to carry greater weight.

The researchers also identified a recurring pattern they described as a “self-defeating rhetoric cycle.” In this cycle, the West takes an action, such as providing military assistance to Ukraine; Russian leaders respond with red line warnings; Western media outlets amplify these warnings; and Western governments then respond by increasing military support. Rather than deterring Western behavior, Russian rhetoric may inadvertently reinforce Western resolve, suggesting that red line statements may fail to achieve their intended coercive effects.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

Adam Stulberg and Stephan de Spiegeleire opened their discussion of the implications of these findings by emphasizing the risks of misunderstanding adversary rhetoric. Western analysts often assume that threats must be credible and clearly defined to influence behavior. However, the Russian approach may prioritize ambiguity and psychological influence over traditional deterrence logic. As a result, Western responses to Russian rhetoric may at times misinterpret the purpose of these statements, at the risk of potentially blundering into escalation that neither side is seeking to manipulate.

Several policy lessons followed. First, analysts and policymakers should avoid mirror imaging and be cautious about assuming that adversaries share the same strategic logic. Second, analytical methods should improve. Traditional approaches to intelligence analysis often rely heavily on selective interpretation of statements, whereas AI-driven analysis can help identify patterns across large datasets and reduce the risk of cherry-picking evidence, particularly when analysis is grounded in thousands of linked statements and events. Third, the researchers emphasized the value of open data sharing, arguing that accessible and consistently maintained datasets can help social scientists work more efficiently and pursue more reliable findings.

To conclude the presentation, the speakers answered questions from the audience, including whether actual military events could be linked to rhetoric through a similar model, how confident they were in their conclusions, and how tone might be analyzed across other databases.

This article is republished from Tufts Russia and Eurasia Program. Read the original article.

While the trip will remain a cornerstone experience for many interested in Europe and international affairs, the program now offers more opportunities for students, including STEM majors, to gain deep on-the-ground insight into international technology governance by directly engaging with the global bodies that regulate tech.

The program, which is accepting applications through Feb. 15, now also includes an optional research extension with two tracks — economic security and space policy.

“Despite the rapidly changing international system, the European Union remains the key trade and investment partner of the United States, an indispensable ally, and an essential area of study,” said Vicki Birchfield, professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs and the program’s director.

“With talented new faculty like Carly Potz-Nielsen and Thomas González Roberts, it is an opportune moment to evolve the program and incorporate a new focus on technology governance where their respective expertise can provide intellectual depth and dynamism," said Birchfield, who also is co-director of the Center for European and Transatlantic Studies.

The program allows students to earn 12 credit hours in 10 weeks, with the possibility of earning up to three more credit hours through an optional research add-on. 

A seminar course on the European Union (INTA 4230/6320) and a class on Human Rights in Europe (INTA 3031/6803) will return. However, to accommodate the new focus on tech governance, a European security course previously taught during the study abroad will be folded into the Transatlantic Relations course (INTA 3223/6833). 

That will free up space for a new technology governance class taught by Potz-Nielsen and Roberts: Global Politics of Technology (INTA 3044/8803).

"The added focus on technology governance taps into some of the biggest challenges future policymakers will face,” said Potz-Nielsen. “With tech woven into almost every part of our lives and digital markets booming, understanding the roles that governments can — or should — play in regulating technology tackles fundamental questions about privacy, security, and fairness.” 

Students participating in the program will visit centers of European power, influence, and culture, including Metz, Strasbourg, and Paris in France; Brussels; The Hague and Amsterdam in the Netherlands; and Bucharest, Romania, where students will visit Romanian military headquarters, research firms, and cultural sites. The program also visits Munich and Berlin, as well as Geneva and Bern, Switzerland.

Those stops in Switzerland will be particularly interesting to students interested in technology and space policy, said Roberts, an assistant professor and director of the new Engineering Space Policy Laboratory.

“Switzerland plays a unique role in shaping how technology is governed worldwide, from outer space to the digital economy,” he said. “This program is a chance to see that innovation and governance evolve together — and showcase how both liberal arts and STEM students have a vital place in shaping that future."

Students may also extend their program with a two-week research option, choosing between a track on economic security and digital economies offered by Potz-Nielsen, as well as Roberts’ track on space policy. 

Both tracks will guide students through a full-cycle research experience, utilizing semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and structured observation with partners throughout the 10-week itinerary to develop a final project.

Applications for the program are due Feb. 15, with payment due on April 15.

In a new article published in the global security policy journal The Washington Quarterly, Associate Professor Rachel Whitlark explores how U.S. President Donald Trump’s long-held views on nuclear proliferation made his June strike on Iranian nuclear facilities foreseeable.

Whitlark’s 2021 book, All Options on the Table, argues that a leader’s long-held personal beliefs about nuclear weapons can help us predict how they will act in executive office, should they encounter an adversary attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.

In the article, Whitlark traces Trump’s belief system back decades. She notes that in a 1985 interview, Trump called nuclear proliferation "the greatest problem of the world” and expressed a particular fear of a "Third World madman getting the bomb.”

This "proliferation pessimism," and Trump’s general perspective on the dangers of nuclear weapons and global proliferation, Whitlark says, was consistent. In his 2000 book, Trump praised Israel’s 1981 preventive strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, stating, "they did what they had to do to survive." By 2011, his focus had turned to Iran, writing that its program "must be stopped by any and all means necessary."

Whitlark notes that we are entering a new age in which nuclear weapons once again pose a significant threat, but this time with multiple states possessing such arms — a significant complication compared to the bipolar Cold War conflict.

“It is, therefore, worth paying careful attention to what future leaders think about nuclear weapons in world politics long before they enter national executive office, as these issues are likely to loom large moving forward,” Whitlark writes.

What Homer’s 'Iliad' Has to Say About the Real Dangers of Military AI

The debate about artificial intelligence in warfare is missing a critical element, argues Professor Jon R. Lindsay: the timeless, irrational, and often dark human emotion that drives so much conflict.

In a new article for the journal Minds and Machines, Lindsay suggests that Homer’s epic poem, the Iliad, provides a better framework for understanding the true risks of military AI than debates over software and policy.

Much of the discussion around military AI, Lindsay notes, focuses on the “rational alignment of AI means with human ends,” such as ensuring weapons follow rules of engagement. However, he says this viewpoint overlooks that war is often driven by human passions such as rage, status, fear, and revenge.

Lindsay points to the central figure of the Iliad, Achilles. His devastating wrath — first at his commander over a matter of pride, and later in a grief-fueled quest for vengeance — dictates the course of the war. These motivations are not strategic or rational, but deeply human. Lindsay suggests that AI will not eliminate these "Homeric judgments," but instead will become a powerful amplifier for them.

“The true horrors of battlefield AI come less from the misalignment of machines,” Lindsay writes, “and more from the Homeric judgment of the warriors who wield them.”

EU Struggles to Adapt Trade Policy in a More Dangerous World

Professor Alasdair R. Young discusses the European Union’s efforts to adapt g its trade policy to the world’s new, more aggressive, geopolitical environment for an article in the journal Comparative European Politics.

For decades, Young says, the EU viewed economic interdependence as overwhelmingly positive. But a series of unanticipated shocks from the U.S., China, and Russia has exposed how those ties can create vulnerabilities.

Young, associate dean for faculty development in the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts and the Nunn School’s Neal Family Chair, says the EU’s response has been uneven. Some tools to enhance its economic security were created, but they were weakened by member states’ reluctance to cede control, while efforts to develop offensive capabilities, like unilateral export controls, stalled completely. Young says internal divisions are the primary obstacle, concluding that the EU’s ability to adapt “is more limited the further it intrudes on core state competences” like security and foreign policy.

Pentagon's 'Economic Blind Spot' Threatens National Security, Says Former NATO Commander

The U.S. Department of Defense’s failure to integrate economics into military planning is a strategic blind spot that weakens national security, says Distinguished Professor of the Practice Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, NATO’s former commander.

In an article for the journal Survival, Breedlove argues that while adversaries such as China treat economic policy as warfare, the Defense Department operates without a chief economist or a unified economic strategy. This disconnect leads to misguided policies that trade long-term strength for short-term fixes, Breedlove says.

Breedlove says examples of issues caused by this approach include a monopoly on submarine construction that has caused massive cost overruns, threatening key alliance and blunt export controls on semiconductors that deprive U.S. firms of revenue for innovation and help China close the technology gap.

"Without harnessing economics as a weapon of war," he writes, "the Pentagon will continue trading future military strength for short-term expediency — an error China is counting on.”

Local Gender Quotas May Backfire for Women Seeking Higher Office, Study Finds

Associate Professor Anjali Thomas was part of a research group that found gender quotas in local elections in the North Indian state of Bihar didn’t increase voter support for female candidates in higher-level elections. Instead, they caused a backlash with certain groups of men — even those otherwise inclined to support women candidates, Thomas and her coauthors wrote in an article for Publius: The Journal of Federalism.

The research challenges the common assumption that local quotas create a positive "spillover effect" for women seeking state or national office, Thomas and her coauthors wrote.

"Overall, our research suggests grounds for pessimism regarding whether local gender quotas could ease the pathway for female candidates by changing voter attitudes,” they said.

The study, based on a survey experiment with nearly 2,000 voters in the North Indian state of Bihar, tested the "multilevel learning" theory — that voters exposed to effective female leaders at the village level would be more likely to support women for state office. However, Thomas and her coauthors found no evidence for this hypothesis, even when the local female leaders were well-educated or perceived as effective by citizens.

Instead, the study's results suggest that local quotas may lower support for female candidates among certain men. For men in male-dominated households, for instance, exposure to the quotas caused them to move from having no gender preference to actively preferring male candidates.

Among younger, "partially progressive" men who initially favored female candidates, being represented by an educated woman elected via a local quota erased their pro-woman preference entirely.

Thomas and her co-authors conclude their findings serve as a "cautionary note that local gender quotas should not be used as a stand-in for serious efforts to increase women's representation at higher levels of government." Instead, policymakers must anticipate and address the potential for voter backlash.

“EPSL is a policy-impact laboratory, dedicated to creating domain-informed, data-driven tools for outer space decision-makers,” Roberts said. “I’m thrilled to be taking on this work with our world-class students here at Tech.”

To learn more, read the full story.

The authors highlight the state’s unique ecosystem — global air connectivity, a pro-business civic culture, a diverse workforce, and strong universities — where students learn to integrate technology, policy, and human-centered design. They contend that investing in development strengthens democracy and markets, builds resilience against extremism and displacement, and yields local benefits (e.g., applying maternal health and food-security solutions in communities across Georgia).

“Supporting global development is an investment in a safer, stronger, and more prosperous world, including here in Georgia,” they write, urging state leaders to continue championing this “glocal” approach.

Read the full op-ed in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

Hosted by the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech Arts, and Spelman College, the bomb event on Sept. 16 gave the audience an uncomfortable and unsettling front-row seat to the nuclear threat that hangs largely unnoticed over our daily lives.

The event began with the bomb film, an almost hour-long film that combines disturbing and sometimes beautiful archival footage, animation, music, and text to explore the complex cultural and technological impact of nuclear weapons. The film is available streaming on Amazon, Apple TV, Tubi, Roku, and other platforms.

After the screening, there was a panel discussion with former Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; Smriti Keshari, one of the bomb’s creators; and Rachel Whitlark, a Georgia Tech expert on nuclear proliferation, moderated by WABE host Rose Scott.

“When you look at the film you realize that basically this is God’s universe at stake. It’s not winning or losing a war. It’s a question of whether we destroy the Earth. And that means all of us, whether we want to or not, have to pay attention to it,” Nunn said.

The panel discussed the need for more public debate and awareness of nuclear threats. Keshari said her team conducted informal interviews with members of the public while working on the bomb. They were surprised by the number of people who thought nuclear weapons were no longer a real threat and had little knowledge of how many there were and where.

“I remember when we were editing the film in Los Angeles, I would drive past the Hollywood sign and I would think ‘instead of the Hollywood sign, what if there was just a nuclear weapon right here?’ What if, instead of every single weapon being hidden underground or on a submarine, they were above and people could actually see them? We would start having a lot of strong opinions about them.”

The panel discussed how AI could accelerate nuclear threats. Whitlark outlined how AI’s increasingly intense use of power may ramp up demand for nuclear power across the globe.

“We can very quickly get from the data needs of AI to the need to power those data centers,” Whitlark said. “One of the ways we may be doing that is with nuclear energy, and with nuclear energy comes the possibility of nuclear weapons. We need to be thoughtful about that.”

Spreading awareness among young people of the threat of nuclear war or accidents is particularly important, said Nunn.

“It may take 20 years but if we don’t do that the dangers we now see and the dangers we saw during the Cold War are going to get much, much worse with the speed of nuclear weapons, the lack of decision time, and the conflict between nuclear powers,” Nunn said.

The bomb exhibition runs free through Oct. 16 at the Ferst Center and includes student art and a graphic narrative on nuclear close calls.

Combining archival footage, animation, music, and text, the bomb offers a visceral, non-linear, and unsettling experience, taking audiences inside the complex cultural and technological realm of nuclear weapons.

The installation will kick off its run at Georgia Tech with a screening of the bomb film Sept. 16 at 6:30 p.m. at the Ferst Center for the Arts. The screening will include a discussion moderated by WABE host Rose Scott with special guest Senator Sam Nunn, a global leader in nuclear threat reduction and a Distinguished Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, and the film’s creators.

The conversation will delve into the film’s themes, the urgent relevance of nuclear disarmament today, and how art and keenly crafted policy, in tandem, can provoke change. 

After the kick-off event, the bomb exhibit will run until Oct. 16 at the Ferst Center of the Arts. Throughout the duration of the exhibition, the Sam Nunn School will host a series of other panels and guest lectures themed around various aspects of this topic. Links to those events already announced can be found below and stay tuned for more:

• 9/17 - Reassessing Nuclear Proliferation in an Era of Global Disarray
• 9/17 - What is the Future of Nuclear?

The exhibit launched at Princeton University in Fall 2024 and has made its way to University of British Columbia, University of Denver, and University of New Mexico. It now arrives at Georgia Tech. Our version of the exhibit also features a powerful graphic narrative of a nuclear close call produced by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey alongside submitted student art that focuses on what the theme “activism through art” means to them.

Live performances of the bomb were staged at the Tribeca Film Festival, the Berlin Film Festival, the Glastonbury Festival, the Sydney Festival, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremonies.

Register: https://arts.gatech.edu/event/georgia-tech-arts-presents-bomb-symposium

Countries and companies seek to gain access to what is increasingly viewed as prime real estate for future space operations that may enable future scientific discovery and allow for significant commercial gain. However, this increase of lunar activities may very well spark an international crisis due to the absence of clearly defined rules and norms related to the moon. As more state actors and private firms develop plans and capabilities to establish a presence on the moon, the window for addressing these challenges prior to a crisis is closing. The United States and its allies should seek to engage China, Russia, and other spacefaring nations in an inclusive dialogue and put procedures in place to share information on potential norms and best practices, technical criteria, mechanisms, and procedures for engaging in lunar activities. This dialogue should incorporate information and experience from commercial actors involved in lunar activity, and it should remain flexible as we continue to learn about the lunar environment.

While China’s Chang’e 6 is remarkable for its scientific value, this mission also carries with it a reminder of the looming challenges surrounding geopolitical competition in lunar space. This competition raises a host of questions: Who can use and claim ownership to lunar resources? What rules and procedures should be established to avoid armed conflict between spacefaring actors? The answers to the questions have clear policy implications. Without a clear legal framework or norms, competition among commercial and national actors could trigger conflict in and among spacefaring actors.

Stress-Testing the Existing Space Governance Framework

To explore these critical issues — together with our colleagues Svetla Ben Itzhak, Gregory Miller, and James Clay Moltz — we led a tabletop exercise that envisioned a plausible crisis in 2029. This exercise, which included American regional and space experts with non-governmental and government experience, presented the following scenario: An Indian private company, Chandra Ltd., lands near Shackleton Crater and declares a 50-kilometer “safety zone” around its operations. This exercise was designed to intentionally invoke the language of “safety zones” articulated in the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, and which has been criticized by both Russia and China. Moreover, the exercise introduced a twist: By using a fictional Indian space company, it became clear that the language of the Artemis Accords created challenges not only for China and Russia but also for the United States. In the scenario, two other commercial entities, one American and one Chinese, had previously announced plans to land in the same region that had been covered within the Indian space company’s designated safety zone.

This fictional crisis was designed to stress-test the existing space governance framework and examine how a multi-stakeholder environment might respond. What we found was instructive: Clear rules did not emerge from the crisis. Instead, the focus was on the process of developing rules that were inclusive, fair, and adaptable. Moreover, the exercise raised important questions about the role of private actors in shaping lunar governance and suggested the importance of third parties with greater perceived neutrality in developing guidelines for preventing future conflict. More broadly, these findings suggest, as we highlight in our recent paper, that while there is flexibility and willingness to cooperate on developing a new lunar governance framework, states might not yet have well-formed views for negotiations. States are just learning about this evolving environment in which the strength of the norms around governance is unclear.

The Heart of the Matter: Safety Zones in a Legal Gray Area

The Artemis Accords, a non-binding set of principles developed by the United States and its partners and signed by over 50 countries to enhance the governance of civil exploration and the use of outer space, encourage the use of safety zones to promote transparency and reduce the risk of harmful interference with the activities of other actors. However, the accords do not specify the process of how to use a safety zone or how even to define one, beyond general guidance to leverage commonly accepted scientific and engineering principles. The concept of safety zones has proved controversial to other major spacefaring actors such as China and Russia, with some Chinese analysts characterizing it as a form of colonization and Roscosmos director Gen. Dmitry Rogozin likening it to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Hyperbole aside, the contention is that a country could make de facto territorial claims, restricting the access of other actors to strategically valuable sites, under the guise of safeguarding scientific operations. At an even more fundamental level, the foundational Outer Space Treaty, upon which the Artemis Accords is grounded, requires parties to avoid harmful interference with others’ activities and leaves key terms such as “due regard” undefined.

This ambiguity leaves room for diverging interpretations. In our scenario, the U.S. team, which was divided into military and civil-commercial teams, viewed the safety zone as a useful, albeit imperfect, deconfliction tool. The U.S. team, however, worried that overly broad or unilateral declarations could amount to de facto territorial claims, thereby undermining the Outer Space Treaty. Participants representing India defended the declaration as a necessary operational step, arguing it was technical in nature and consistent with international norms. They asserted that Chandra Ltd.’s actions reinforced the Artemis Accords. In sharp contrast, the Chinese and Russian teams rejected the safety zone, arguing that such claims lack legal standing subject to review within an inclusive international environment and body. This position adopted in a fictional tabletop exercise mirrors Russia and China’s real-world opposition to the Artemis Accords. In the exercise, the Russian and Chinese teams were concerned not just about the size of the zone but about the precedent it set and the absence of a multilateral process to govern it. They saw Chandra Ltd.’s actions as an example of how a commercial company could exploit a governance structure to benefit the United States.

Commercial Actors at the Forefront — and Under Scrutiny

The exercise also shed light on challenges surrounding the role of private actors in lunar governance. While participants playing the roles of American and Indian representatives tended to see commercial actors as essential stakeholders — capable, innovative, and already embedded in state policy — the Chinese and Russian teams rejected their authority to establish operational norms. For them, the notion that a private company could constrain the activities of other states or companies, even under the guise of safety, was both legally and politically unacceptable.

As private missions increase in number and complexity, and as governments rely on commercial partners to achieve national objectives, this legal gray zone is becoming increasingly muddled and unstable. This reflects not only the exponential growth role of the commercial sector, which now accounts for the most launches worldwide, led by SpaceX, but also a broader challenge in the evolving field of space law. Under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, states are responsible for the activities of non-governmental entities. However, the treaty does not define the scope of that supervision or what constitutes adequate authorization and continuing oversight. Geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China raises the stakes even further. At a broader level, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s opposition and threats to Starlink’s operation in Ukraine was one of the first major events to question the relationship between commercial actors and national assets, raising questions about whether a country could be held responsible for the actions taken by private companies.

One of the most important findings from the tabletop exercise was that absent shared procedures, space norms will be shaped by precedent rather than principle. In world politics, there is no central authority to enforce law and thus compliance is more closely related to the costs of defying power, politics, and peer pressure. These dynamics form the basis of customary international law and mean that states will oppose a behavior that could establish legal norms unfavorable to their interests. Thus, if activities that become precedent contradict principle and go unchallenged, these activities can redefine what is considered lawful.

The exercise also exposed a political dimension to commercial activity: It matters who makes the first move. The outcome of this exercise may have been very different, as many participants acknowledged, if the declarant had been a U.S., Russian, or Chinese company. India’s perceived status as a relatively neutral space actor muted some reactions, as the only major competitor represented was China.

Takeaways

Our exercise serves as a cautionary tale: The United States and other leading spacefaring nations should create mechanisms and procedures in real time to avoid conflict and escalation. The tabletop exercise highlighted the importance of developing widely accepted technical criteria for safety zones and establishing both national and international procedures for proposing, deconflicting, and registering them. Preventing conflict related to activities on the moon will depend on the perceived legitimacy of these procedures. Stakeholders could create these procedures under the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space working groups or another neutral forum to define the operational parameters of safety zones, including size, duration, purpose, and notification protocols. Another proposal was for an international registry of lunar activities, including planned landings, infrastructure, and declared zones — akin to how the International Telecommunication Union manages orbital slots and spectrum. These are issues that could potentially be considered within the Action Team for Lunar Activities Consultation formed earlier this year within the U.N. Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Notably, many participants supported a phased approach to lunar governance: First, encourage consensus among like-minded actors (such as Artemis Accords signatories), and second, broaden the dialogue to include states outside that coalition. In our exercise, participants identified the United Arab Emirates as a promising convening power, able to host discussions with both developing and major spacefaring nations. This suggestion is similar to calls from other analysts for the United States to partner with “capable mid-tier partners” that are increasingly influential players in space.

Our exercise reinforced an important lesson. The perceived legitimacy of rules in space, as on Earth, is tied to the perceived fairness and transparency of the procedures used to create them. With no agreed-upon process for resolving lunar conflicts, underlying mistrust can exacerbate tensions between great powers with advanced space programs and those countries with developing space programs. The need for a rules-based order that also integrates commercial entities has never been higher. One such venue could be the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation. This Action Team could be a useful venue as it allows for information sharing and expert level input, including the perspectives of a range of public and private stakeholders, under the auspices of the United Nations.

With increasing activity at the Lunar South Pole, the window for building this process is closing. If international governance procedures are not in place, we will be left to manage conflict with less credibility and fewer tools.

Mariel Borowitz, Ph.D. is an associate professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, director of the Georgia Tech Center for Space Policy and International Relations, and head of the Nunn School Program on International Affairs, Science, and Technology.

Lincoln Hines, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is also a faculty affiliate at the Nunn School’s Center for Space Policy and International Relations and a 2025–2026 Wilson China Fellow at the Wilson Center.

Lawrence Rubin, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Image: U.S. Space Force

This article is republished from War on the Rocks. Read the original article.

Q: If you were in the Senate today, how would you do your job in a political climate so divided and polarized as ours?

Sen. Nunn: It would be a lot more difficult in today’s atmosphere than when I was there. We approached it more on the issue itself and wrestling with that issue, seeing where we could agree and not agree. That would still be my approach. 

I think the strength of the committee system has eroded. Things today get kicked up to the leadership level, whether it’s the healthcare bill or whether it’s some other major legislation. And the committees don’t serve as strong a function. They are still important, but if I were there, I would really be trying to strengthen the committees. Committees should be looked at more as how you build coalitions to pass meaningful legislation for the benefit of the people.

Q: How has the United States' engagement in NATO changed since the start of the second Trump administration?

Nunn: The world situation and the risks, particularly the nuclear risks, have gone up very significantly. Unfortunately, because of the comments of the Trump administration about whether we would come to the rescue if there was an invasion involving NATO members and raising doubts in the minds of Europeans in that regard, there is certainly for the first time in several decades discussion about how they become more independent of America.

They certainly need to be much stronger than they are, and I totally agree with the Trump administration’s efforts to get the Europeans to step up more to the plate themselves. But I would not do it by raising the whole question of whether Article 5 still applies. That is the heart of the alliance.

Q: President Trump has decided that tariffs on imports will be a key economic and political lever in his second term. How will these tariffs impact America's trading relationships with our closest allies?

 Nunn: The tariffs have come about not just on economic matters, but also on drug matters and on immigration matters. Which makes it much more difficult, because tariffs are really taxes.

Mexico and Canada are good neighbors. We have immigration problems from the south and no doubt that’s a serious problem. Cooperation on the immigration question depends on strengthening the countries to the south, not just Mexico, but the countries to the south of Mexico. I think we need a whole review of our policy and how the whole region can work together to greatly strengthen those countries in terms of their prosperity, their economic viability, and their governance so that we will not have such a major part of the populations of those countries trying to get to our own country.

The strangest thing of all to me is the Republican Party has always championed lower tax rates because they knew that was important to economic growth. Sometimes they may take it too far, but nevertheless that has been a historic Republican Party position. This is the largest global tax increase, including tax on American citizens, we have seen in many, many years.

I would hope President Trump would develop a win-win type approach and that China would do likewise. When you have an approach that for you to win, your counterpart has to lose, it means it is extremely difficult to get any kind of lasting agreement.

Q: Farmers are concerned with how tariffs will impact their markets and their ability to plan for future crops. What should Georgia farmers expect to come their way as President Trump's tariffs are levied?

Nunn: I think Georgia farmers are going to get hurt like all the other farmers in the country who need markets abroad. It depends on the crop as to how much we sell abroad and how important that market is, but most Georgia crops depend on customers, not just in our own country and our own region, but customers abroad.

I think that is true with everything from blueberries to pecans to the meat industry. We depend on other states, and we depend on other regions of the country, and other regions of the world. Agriculture has a huge stake in global trade.

Q: The Democratic Party suffered a bitter defeat in November. What changes do you think the party should make to regain the trust of the American people?

Nunn: The perception is the Democratic Party has moved too far left. Whether that is entirely accurate or not can certainly be debated. One of the things Democrats have to recognize is the further left the Democratic Party is perceived to be, the more right the Republican Party is likely to be.

Q: What advice do you have for internationally minded students who want to make the world a better place?

Nunn: I think studying history is a hugely important building block for diplomacy, for international relationships, and for the international business side of the economy.

Murdie, the new dean of the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts and an expert in international relations, also has extensively studied game theory and finds it incredibly relevant to her work in human rights and human security. Typically defined as the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions, game theory relies on understanding distinctively non-mathematical factors like psychology and cultural norms.

“To make a good game theory model, you have to understand the motivations of individuals, and you can't understand those motivations from only the sciences. You really need the humanistic side,” Murdie says. “If you're going to do anything as a game theorist, you must understand how humans function, and that's more than just the natural sciences or the social sciences. It’s inherently interdisciplinary.”

The liberal arts provide that understanding not just in game theory but in any discipline, says Murdie. “Liberal arts are the lifeline through which all other knowledge flows,” she says.

Interdisciplinary Lens

Murdie’s background in human rights gave her an early appreciation of how many research areas outside of international relations play a key role in improving lives worldwide.

“Coming from a human rights tradition, you always start with an interdisciplinary lens,” she says.

Murdie’s training and research have included a wide range of students, professors, and collaborators — from economics, law, history, sociology, business, statistics, and more. She says human rights and international affairs are not at all unique in demanding an interdisciplinary approach. Solving any complex problem requires knowledge of many direct and indirect factors.

To connect the dots, you need collaborators from a range of disciplines. And to trust and work with collaborators from each discipline, you need at least a basic, working level of knowledge about it, says Murdie.

“How do you respect someone else's method of inquiry and someone else's method of creation? That's something universities don't train students well for unless there’s a truly interdisciplinary focus,” she says.

Ivan Allen Advantage

Whether someone is launching a business, creating a new technology, or negotiating a treaty, connecting the dots is crucial to innovation, as well as staying more than a few steps ahead of AI and automation. The Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts is perfectly positioned to make more of those connections as a liberal arts hub embedded within an institute making the latest breakthroughs in engineering, computing, and sciences, says Murdie, who joined Georgia Tech from the University of Georgia. She calls it the “Ivan Allen Advantage.”

“I think the Ivan Allen Advantage goes in two directions. I think in one direction, our advantage for all Tech students is that they need that liberal arts training in order to be better communicators and actually think about humanity and how technology can be used,” Murdie says. “And I think the Ivan Allen Advantage also is for those of us who are passionate about the liberal arts, who want to focus on the human condition. Doing so in an environment that is tech-informed leads to better student outcomes.”

The College is also well positioned (as a connector of dots) to channel faculty and student research expertise toward solving problems and improving lives, Murdie says. The Center for Advanced Communications Policy (CACP) and Center for Urban Research represent excellent examples of how the liberal arts can act as a hub and facilitator for tackling complex challenges, she adds.

Training for the Future

As AI and other technologies accelerate changes in nearly every aspect of our lives, the ability to be creative, lead complex teams, solve problems, and connect with others has never been more important. What better way to master those skills than to enhance your education with the study of literature, languages, history, and culture? Murdie asks.

“We're going to build the liberal arts into what it should be — the best place for people to get training for the future. But that training needs to be informed by technology, and it needs to be informed by the deep understanding of AI and machine learning,” Murdie says.

“If you’re an engineer who can't write or express ideas clearly, it's easier for your job to be taken by AI. It's our ability to be human that keeps us in the game.”