{"366311":{"#nid":"366311","#data":{"type":"news","title":"Researchers work to counter a new class of coffee shop hackers","body":[{"value":"\u003Cp\u003EIf you\u2019re sitting in a coffee shop, tapping away on your laptop, feeling safe from hackers because you didn\u2019t connect to the shop\u2019s wi-fi, think again. The bad guys may be able to see what you\u2019re doing just by analyzing the low-power electronic signals your laptop emits even when it\u2019s not connected to the Internet.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnd smartphones may be even more vulnerable to such spying.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EResearchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology are investigating where these information \u201cleaks\u201d originate so they can help hardware and software designers develop strategies to plug them. By studying emissions from multiple computers, the researchers have developed a metric for measuring the strength of the leaks \u2013 known technically as \u201cside-channel signal\u201d \u2013 to help prioritize security efforts.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cPeople are focused on security for the Internet and on the wireless communication side, but we are concerned with what can be learned from your computer without it intentionally sending anything,\u201d said Alenka Zajic, an assistant professor in Georgia Tech\u2019s \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.ece.gatech.edu\/\u0022\u003ESchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering\u003C\/a\u003E. \u201cEven if you have the Internet connection disabled, you are still emanating information that somebody could use to attack your computer or smartphone.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EResults of the research were presented December 15 at the 47th Annual IEEE\/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture in Cambridge, U.K. The work is sponsored by the National Science Foundation and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESide-channel emissions can be measured several feet away from an operating computer using a variety of spying methods. Electromagnetic emissions can be received using antennas hidden in a briefcase, for instance. Acoustic emissions \u2013 sounds produced by electronic components such as capacitors \u2013 can be picked up by microphones hidden beneath tables. Information on power fluctuations, which can help hackers determine what the computer is doing, can be measured by fake battery chargers plugged into power outlets adjacent to a laptop\u2019s power converter.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESome signals can be picked up by a simple AM\/FM radio, while others require more sophisticated spectrum analyzers.\u0026nbsp; And computer components such as voltage regulators produce emissions that can carry signals produced elsewhere in the laptop.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAs a demonstration, Zajic typed a simulated password on one laptop that was not connected to the Internet. On the other side of a wall, a colleague using another disconnected laptop read the password as it was being typed by intercepting side-channel signals produced by the first laptop\u2019s keyboard software, which had been modified to make the characters easier to identify.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cThere is nothing added in the code to raise suspicion,\u201d said Milos Prvulovic, an associate professor in the Georgia Tech \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.scs.gatech.edu\/\u0022\u003ESchool of Computer Science\u003C\/a\u003E. \u201cIt looks like a correct, but not terribly efficient version of normal keyboard driver software. And in several applications, such as normal spell-checking, grammar-checking and display-updating, the existing software is sufficient for a successful attack.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECurrently, there is no mention in the open literature of hackers using side-channel attacks, but the researchers believe it\u2019s only a matter of time before that happens. The potential risks of side-channel emissions have been reported over the years, but not at the level of detail being studied by the Georgia Tech researchers.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cOf course, it\u2019s possible that somebody is using it right now, but they are not sharing that information,\u201d Zajic noted.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETo counter the threat, the researchers are determining where the leaks originate.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cWe are trying to understand why these side channels exist and what can be done to fix these leaks,\u201d said Zajic. \u201cWe are measuring computers and smartphones to identify the parts of the devices that leak the most. That information can guide efforts to redesign them, and on an architectural level, perhaps change the instructions in the software to change the device behavior.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEach computer operation has a different potential for leaking information. The processor draws different amounts of current depending on the operation, creating fluctuations that can be measured. Saving data to memory also requires a large amount of current, creating a \u201cloud\u201d operation.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cWhen you are executing instructions in the processor, you generate a different type of waveform than if you are doing things in memory,\u201d explained Zajic. \u201cAnd there is interaction between the two.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETo measure the vulnerability, Zajic, Prvulovic and graduate student Robert Callen developed a metric known as \u201csignal available to attacker\u201d (SAVAT), which is a measure of the strength of the signal emitted. They measured the level of SAVAT for 11 different instructions executed on three different laptops, and found the largest signals when the processors accessed off-chip memory.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cIt is not really possible to eliminate all side-channel signal,\u201d said Prvulovic. \u201cThe trick is to make those signals weak, so potential attackers would have to be closer, use larger antennas and utilize time-consuming signal analyses. We have found that some operations are much \u2018louder\u2019 than others, so quieting them would make it more difficult for attackers.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe researchers are also now studying smartphones, whose compact design and large differential between idle and in-use power may make them more vulnerable. So far, they have only looked at Android devices.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBecause the spying is passive and emits no signals itself, users of computers and smartphones wouldn\u2019t know they\u2019re being watched.\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u201cIf somebody is putting strange objects near your computer, you certainly should beware,\u201d said Zajic. \u201cBut from the user\u2019s perspective, there is not much they can do right now. Based on our research, we hope to develop something like virus scan software that will look for vulnerability in the code and tell developers what they should update to reduce this vulerability.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EThis research has been supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under grant 1318934 and by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) under grant FA9550-14-1-0223. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the NSF or AFOSR.\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003ECITATION\u003C\/strong\u003E: Robert Callan, Alenka Zajic and Milos Prvulovic, \u201cA Practical Methodology for Measuring the Side-Channel Signal Available to the Attacker for Instruction-Level Events,\u201d (47th Annual IEEE\/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture, 2014).\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EResearch News\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EGeorgia Institute of Technology\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003E177 North Avenue\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EAtlanta, Georgia\u0026nbsp; 30332-0181\u0026nbsp; USA\u003C\/strong\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EMedia Relations Contacts\u003C\/strong\u003E: John Toon (404-894-6986) (\u003Ca href=\u0022mailto:jtoon@gatech.edu\u0022\u003Ejtoon@gatech.edu\u003C\/a\u003E) or Brett Israel (404-385-1933) (\u003Ca href=\u0022mailto:brett.israel@comm.gatech.edu\u0022\u003Ebrett.israel@comm.gatech.edu\u003C\/a\u003E).\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cstrong\u003EWriter\u003C\/strong\u003E: John Toon\u003C\/p\u003E","summary":null,"format":"limited_html"}],"field_subtitle":"","field_summary":"","field_summary_sentence":[{"value":"You\u2019re sitting in a coffee shop, tapping away on your laptop, feeling safe from hackers because you didn\u2019t connect to the shop\u2019s wi-fi, think again."}],"uid":"27863","created_gmt":"2015-01-21 09:31:05","changed_gmt":"2016-10-08 03:17:54","author":"Christa Ernst","boilerplate_text":"","field_publication":"","field_article_url":"","dateline":{"date":"2015-01-21T00:00:00-05:00","iso_date":"2015-01-21T00:00:00-05:00","tz":"America\/New_York"},"extras":[],"hg_media":{"366301":{"id":"366301","type":"image","title":"Zajic Side Angle Test","body":null,"created":"1449245817","gmt_created":"2015-12-04 16:16:57","changed":"1475895103","gmt_changed":"2016-10-08 02:51:43","alt":"Zajic Side Angle Test","file":{"fid":"202109","name":"zajic_side_angle.png","image_path":"\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/zajic_side_angle_0.png","image_full_path":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/zajic_side_angle_0.png","mime":"image\/png","size":7348980,"path_740":"http:\/\/hg.gatech.edu\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/740xx_scale\/public\/images\/zajic_side_angle_0.png?itok=dli5mj5M"}}},"media_ids":["366301"],"groups":[{"id":"1271","name":"NanoTECH"}],"categories":[{"id":"153","name":"Computer Science\/Information Technology and Security"},{"id":"149","name":"Nanotechnology and Nanoscience"}],"keywords":[{"id":"115261","name":"Georgia Electronic Design Center; GEDC; electrical engineering; wireless communications"},{"id":"169707","name":"Side-channel emissions"}],"core_research_areas":[{"id":"39451","name":"Electronics and Nanotechnology"}],"news_room_topics":[],"event_categories":[],"invited_audience":[],"affiliations":[],"classification":[],"areas_of_expertise":[],"news_and_recent_appearances":[],"phone":[],"contact":[],"email":["jtoon@gatech.edu"],"slides":[],"orientation":[],"userdata":""}}}