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ARC Colloquium: Dimitris Bertsimas, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Abstract:
We study resource allocation problems that involve multiple self-interested parties or players, and a central decision maker. We introduce and study the price of fairness, which is the relative system efficiency loss under a``fair'' allocation assuming that a fully efficient allocation is one that maximizes the sum of player utilities. We provide a tight characterization for the price of fairness for a general class of fair allocations that includes proportional (Nash) fairness and max-min fairness. We further discuss applications of our results in a variety of real world settings: communication networks, airtransportation and organ transplantation.
(joint work with Vivek Farias and Nikos Trichakis, MIT)
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- Workflow Status:Published
- Created By:Elizabeth Ndongi
- Created:11/16/2011
- Modified By:Fletcher Moore
- Modified:10/07/2016
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