DCL Seminar Series: Takashi Tanaka

Event Details
  • Date/Time:
    • Friday April 19, 2019
      11:00 am - 12:00 pm
  • Location: Groseclose 402
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Summary Sentence: Road traffic games over nonlinear and dynamic transportation networks

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We consider a dynamic game in which multiple ride-hailing companies, each comprised of a large number of drivers, are competing over a shared traffic infrastructure to minimize individual teams’ total travel time. In realistic scenarios where the underlying traffic systems are described by nonlinear, stochastic, and high-dimensional dynamical systems, analyzing such a game is a challenging task. In this talk, we discuss two novel mathematical frameworks that offer powerful tools for such an analysis. As the first framework, we introduce the class of linearly-solvable mean-field games (MFGs). This is a special class of the MFGs where an equilibrium can be found simply by solving a linear system. This is in contrast to the conventional MFG framework where coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equations must be analyzed. Traffic congestion mitigation mechanism based on linearly-solvable MFG is discussed. In the second framework, we discuss Kappen’s path-integral control and its generalization to dynamic games. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium among multiple ride-hailing companies in a stochastic game with nonlinear dynamics can found numerically by forward-in-time Monte-Carlo sampling.

Additional Information

In Campus Calendar

Decision and Control Lab (DCL)

Invited Audience
Faculty/Staff, Postdoc, Public, Graduate students, Undergraduate students
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graduate students
  • Created By: mamstutz3
  • Workflow Status: Published
  • Created On: Dec 11, 2018 - 12:15pm
  • Last Updated: Apr 16, 2019 - 1:58pm